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Abstract 
The problems associated with the BC government’s approach to non-treaty agreements 
stem from an unpredictable variety that does not ensure certainty for investors, nor 
equity for First Nations. The province is taking positive steps, through the New 
Relationship, to find ways of reconciling assertions of Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal 
title in BC. This paper completes a two-step policy analysis of this issue through 
literature and background reviews, a case study analysis and key informant interviews. 
In order to address these specific problems, there needs to be a standardized, base-
level content minimum for consultation and accommodation agreements. This will not 
become a cookie-cutter approach with template agreements, but rather a set of 
minimum standards on which to begin negotiations. This approach provides certainty, 
clarity and equality. Implementing this basket of standards through legislation will ensure 
the necessary certainty and equality to move forward with non-treaty agreements. 
Keywords:  Non-treaty agreements; consultation and accommodation; aboriginal 
rights and title; aboriginal negotiations; lands and resource use 
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Executive Summary 
 
British Columbia is a hotspot for the policy work surrounding the recognition and 
reconciliation of largely undefined aboriginal rights and title with the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty. One way that the provincial government works with First Nations to 
reconcile their rights and title claims with the economic needs of a resource dependent 
provincial economy is to seek out various accommodation agreements. These 
agreements, completed outside of the BC Treaty Process, come in a wide variety of 
shapes and sizes, addressing everything from specific mining projects to entire land use 
plans over wide ranges of habitats and resources. 
The policy problem I address in this report is as follows: British Columbia’s 
approach to accommodation agreements with First Nations lacks consistency. This 
absence of a standardized policy framework for approaching non-treaty agreements 
leads to inconsistency in their application, uncertainty around land and resource 
development and a chilly investment climate clouded with unpredictability. Additionally, 
this has the potential to lead to inequity and unfairness among First Nations in BC and 
may favour those First Nations with the resources and capacity to negotiate agreements. 
In order to fully understand and analyze this problem, I use various 
methodological approaches. First of all, a comprehensive background and literature 
review, including relevant Supreme Court decisions and policy statements, provide 
context for the problem as well as offer partial solutions. Key informant interviews 
provide more in-depth information and expert opinions into this matter. Next, I examine 
six agreements in a case study format in order to assess the variety in these 
agreements. Finally, the report concludes with a two-step multi-criteria policy analysis to 
address the idea of minimum content standards in these agreements and 
implementation options.  
I interviewed representatives from five distinct groups: provincial government 
employees from the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, First Nations 
organizations, provincial politicians, legal experts, and private industry. Four main 
 xi 
themes arose in the interviews. The first was how these non-treaty agreements impacted 
the BC Treaty Process. Here, opinion was mixed, with some believing it had positive, 
trust-building effects, while others say that these non-treaty agreements replaced the 
need to complete comprehensive tripartite treaties. The next main theme was the 
challenges posed by the windfall concept. This refers to the idea that a First Nation 
whose traditional territories include large amounts of profitable resources will be in a 
better negotiating position, and will receive more attention from the provincial 
government, than those without these plentiful resources. Another main theme that 
arose was resource revenue sharing. Key informants noted that providing First Nations 
with a share of provincial revenues garnered from resource development was an 
important source of income but the current program has some limitations. Finally, key 
informants all pointed to the lack of financial, human resources and negotiating capacity 
within First Nations communities as a detriment to the ability to develop non-treaty 
agreements. 
Taking into account the literature and background review and the key informant 
interviews, it became clear that a good consultation and accommodation agreement 
includes First Nation decision-making power over traditional territories as well as 
economic certainty over lands in the province. This ensures both aboriginal and 
provincial objectives are addressed through these agreements.  
Variety in non-treaty agreements is both a blessing and a curse. Content 
measures aimed to address geographic resource realities are very beneficial to ensuring 
good consultation and accommodation agreements. These differences allow the 
agreement to be specifically tailored to the needs, wants and realities of each First 
Nation, without limiting their ability to allow for good consultation and accommodation. 
This flexibility allows provincial negotiators to avoid the problems, both legal and 
practical, of cookie-cutter templates, like those struck down by the court decisions Huu-
ay-aht and Wil’litswx. 
Variety in content measures in consultation and accommodation is not entirely 
positive. Applying different content inclusions in different situations without any clear 
explanation leads to uncertainty and unpredictability around the negotiating process. 
First Nations, industry representatives and even provincial government employees are 
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unsure as to what to expect from these agreements. Often, a First Nation must rely on 
strong human resources, financial and negotiating capacity in order to secure good 
consultation and accommodation measures. This results in unequal treatment of First 
Nations in British Columbia. So the question arises: How to limit the harmful variety in 
non-treaty agreements while preserving the important flexibility? 
The provincial government should adopt a set of minimum standards to include in 
consultation and accommodation agreements to address problems arising from variety 
of content. This basket of minimum standards would help to standardize negotiations 
and bring equality to the process. It is important to note that the implementation of 
minimum standards is not a move towards formula-based approaches or cookie-cutter 
agreements. Ensuring minimum content inclusions allows for the variability of First 
Nations’ situations in BC while also permitting aboriginal communities in BC to have 
equitable footing in entering into these negotiations with the province.   
After evaluating a wide variety of possible content inclusions against a set of ten 
comprehensive criteria, the analysis shows that the following content measures should 
be included in a minimum basket of standards for all non-treaty agreements. 
• Resource Revenue Sharing 
• Economic Accommodation 
• Implementation Funding 
• Engagement Framework 
• Business Participation 
• Government to Government Forum 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Land Use Plans 
• Socio-Economic Objectives 
In order to implement this minimum basket of standards, I analyzed four options 
against a set of six criteria. Based on the multi-criteria analysis, I recommend 
implementing the minimum basket of standards through specific legislation. It would 
provide high levels of certainty for the province and would be feasible for the legislature 
to effect. Private industry and the business community would benefit from the 
standardization and predictability of such reliable legislation. It would legislate equal 
treatment of First Nations at the negotiating process.  
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Implementing a minimum basket of standards through specific legislation is a 
positive step in the right direction. No policy option is perfect and none will ultimately 
bring a definitive end to all the aboriginal rights and title issues in British Columbia. But, 
with the provincial government is in a place where it can make informed, pragmatic 
decisions to move towards reconciliation in British Columbia.
 1 
1. Introduction: Defining the Policy Problem  
After a century and a half long policy of denying aboriginal rights and title in 
Canada, there has been a recent flurry of activity in the area. British Columbia in 
particular, with its lack of formalized treaties, is a hotspot for the policy work surrounding 
the recognition and reconciliation of largely undefined aboriginal rights and title with the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty.  
One way that the provincial government has attempted to work with First Nations 
and reconcile their rights and title claims with the economic needs of a resource 
dependent provincial economy is to seek out various accommodation agreements. For 
the purposes of this study, consultation and accommodation agreements mean any 
agreements entered into between the province and a First Nation that are outside of the 
treaty process that include any amount of consultation and accommodation measures. 
Other terms for these agreements are non-treaty agreements, benefit sharing 
agreements, and impact benefit agreements. These consultation and accommodation 
agreements come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes, addressing everything from 
specific mining projects to entire land use plans over wide ranges of habitats and 
resources.1 
The approach to these non-treaty agreements by the provincial government has 
not been consistently applied and lacks grounding in any standardized policy. Provincial 
staff negotiate and implement these agreements, of which there are approximately 200 
in various forms, independently without reference to any formulated guidelines. Why do 
some agreements only include a cash transfer while others add resource revenue 
 
1 For the purposes of this report, I will use the terms consultation and accommodation 
agreements, accommodation agreements and non-treaty agreements interchangeably, in 
order to avoid repetition and reader fatigue. 
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sharing and capacity development clauses? Why do some recognize resource tenures 
and others do not?  Why do some include co-management while not others?  This lack 
of standardization leads to a whole host of problems such as differences in the equity of 
treatment of First Nations. This also has the potential to unfairly advantage those First 
Nations who possess the financial capacity and human resources to field a strong 
negotiating team. This leaves those First Nations without such capacity at a weaker 
bargaining position and ultimately receiving less benefits.  
Not only that, operating without a standardized approach to non-treaty 
agreements puts the province at a greater risk of being sued in court by affected First 
Nations groups. Aboriginal rights and title cases are expensive, time-consuming and 
tiresome for all involved. Additionally, court cases regarding aboriginal rights and title 
contribute to a very chilly investment climate for BC. With our economy so dependent on 
foreign investment for resource extraction projects, it is in the province’s best interest to 
avoid litigation with First Nations and settle rights and title issues fairly and equally 
through negotiations.  
This study addresses the following policy problem: British Columbia’s 
approach to accommodation agreements with First Nations lacks consistency. 
This absence of a standardized policy framework for approaching non-treaty 
agreements leads to inconsistency in their application, uncertainty around land 
and resource development and a chilly investment climate clouded with 
unpredictability. Additionally, this has the potential to lead to inequity and 
unfairness among First Nations in BC and may favour those First Nations with the 
resources and capacity to negotiate agreements.  
My research questions which stem from this are: Should the British Columbia 
government create a baseline policy directive on approaching consultation and 
accommodation agreements in order to provide for a greater degree of 
standardization? What kind of standards should the government use to assess 
accommodation agreements? How should minimum standards be implemented 
into these agreements? 
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In this study, I use three methodologies to answer the research questions. First a 
comprehensive background and literature review provides a scan of the relevant 
information on this subject. Next I assess six different accommodation agreements in a 
case study format. Using information gained from the literature review and background I 
assess the value of consultation and accommodation measures in these agreements. I 
also use these case studies to highlight the similarities and differences across these 
non-treaty agreements. My next research method is key informant interviews. These 
allow me important insight into the major issues surrounding non-treaty agreements in 
BC.  
The report concludes with a policy analysis. Here, I use all the information in the 
report to compile a list of potential content options for consultation and accommodation 
agreements. I then evaluate these according to set of criteria, also informed by the 
research. I arrive at a minimum basket of standards and then turn to implementation 
options. I evaluate four separate implementation options using a multi-criteria analysis 
framework. This involves compiling a list of criteria to measure and compare the relevant 
implementation options. I conclude with policy recommendations for the provincial 
government. 
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2. Background: Consultation in BC 
Non-treaty consultation and accommodation agreements have a very short 
history in British Columbia. Yet, BC is home to some of the most storied and dramatic 
aboriginal land claims issues in the country. A history of the provincial government’s 
approach to non-treaty agreements is incomplete without a look back into the recent 
history of aboriginal rights and title development in land claims, court cases and public 
policy. 
2.1. Significant Court Cases 
Up until the early 1970’s, federal and provincial policy makers largely ignored 
aboriginal rights and title claims. This was underscored by the White Paper proposal 
from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s liberal government that sought to abolish the 
Indian Act and any special status for Indians. In fact, when musing on whether or not 
aboriginal rights existed in Canada, Trudeau emphatically claimed in Vancouver in 1969 
that “our answer is ‘No.”2 
Things took a significant turn in 1973 with the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) 
ruling on  Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General). In this case, brought forth by 
the Nisga’a Nation of BC, the SCC ruled that aboriginal rights and title had indeed 
existed in Canada prior to European contact. The SCC was split on whether or not the 
Nisga’a claim to the land was valid – a question of whether the Crown had already 
extinguished aboriginal title. But the ruling that aboriginal rights had at one time existed, 
 
2 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. “Remarks on Indian Aboriginal and Treaty Rights.”  Part of a 
Speech given August 8, 1969 in Vancouver. < 
http://ycdl4.yukoncollege.yk.ca/~agraham//nost202/trud1.htm> 
 5 
and thus may continue to exist in non-treaty areas,  opened the door for a whole new era 
of aboriginal rights and title claims. 
Aboriginal rights and title were legally recognized and affirmed by section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. This put the onus on the Crown to confirm and protect 
aboriginal rights and title. Section 35 did not name what aboriginal rights and title were, 
where they existed or how they applied. It was left to government policy, court decisions 
and the common law to fill in this “empty box.”3 This approach to rights and title law, from 
a legal standpoint, is “both unprecedented and vague.” Its unique situation created a 
complex legal doctrine within Canadian common law.4 
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed Section 35 rights in the 1990 case R v 
Sparrow. Here, the SCC ruled that Aboriginal rights exist and that the government 
cannot unilaterally infringe upon these rights.5 In the first mention of the duty to consult, 
the Court here stressed that in upholding the honour of the Crown, governments must 
work to minimize infringements and award compensation if necessary.6 In terms of 
resource allocation, this decision gave the Musqueam First Nation priority to the Pacific 
salmon fishery to address the infringement upon their Section 35 rights.7 
Following Sparrow, which concerned Aboriginal rights, the SCC’s ruling on 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia in 1997 confirmed the existence of aboriginal title in BC 
and defined its unique meaning of ownership.8 The SCC described aboriginal title as 
encompassing “the right to use the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of 
 
3 Dwight G. Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples, Purich: 
Saskatoon, 2009: 14. 
4 Thomas Isaac and Anthony Knox, “Canadian Aboriginal Law: Creating Certainty in Resource 
Development,” Journal of Energy and Natural Resource Law 25.4 (Nov 2004): 428-439. 
5 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
6 Maria Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights, National Centre for First Nations Governance Research Paper, Feb 2008: 8-9. 
7 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 7. 
8 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 
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purposes.”9 The Court specifically referred to consultation and accommodation in terms 
of resource development. The ruling stated that the Crown must consult with aboriginal 
communities in land-use decision-making processes.10 It added that Aboriginal title has 
an inherent economic aspect to it that must be acknowledged.11 The Court stated that 
the Crown must pro-actively address potential infringements of Aboriginal title. Yet, the 
Court maintained that the Crown can infringe upon aboriginal rights and title for the 
greater economic good of society, as long as the Aboriginal group is properly consulted 
and accommodated.  The proper procedures are expressed in what the courts refer to 
as the duty to consult, or Consultation requirements. 
In 2004 the SCC ruled on two cases that again affected the BC Government’s 
relationship with First Nations.12 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 
and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) 
expanded on the duty to consult and accommodate outlined in both Sparrow and 
Delgamuukw.13 Chief Justice McLachlin asserted that the Crown must consult with First 
Nations prior to any perceived action that may infringe upon aboriginal rights or title. 
Also, the Crown’s duty to consult is not limited to proven aboriginal rights and title, but 
arises prior to proof.14 This is especially important in BC, where the vast majority of the 
land is not subject to historical treaties and aboriginal groups have asserted their claims 
to aboriginal title over the entire land mass. 
Chief Justice McLachlin iterated that the content and scope of the duty to consult 
and accommodate is very contextual and fact-specific. The scope of the duty to consult 
is determined by a spectrum of possibilities: the stronger the prima facie evidence of 
 
9 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para 117. 
10 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 19. 
11 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; Morellato, Crown’s Constitutional Duty 
to Consult, 20-21. 
12 Newman, 9 
13 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73; 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 74. 
14 Newman, 14; Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 24. 
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claim and the stronger the potential adverse impact on those claims, the richer is the 
duty to consult. Consultation measures also lie upon a spectrum, from minimal notice to 
the accommodation of rights and title. So, the Crown’s consultation strategy must be 
approached differently in each situation.15 The Court added that consultation should take 
place at the strategic and policy-making level in order to be effective and not just at the 
operational level of government decision-making.16 
Other significant court cases followed Haida/Taku. The 2007 Tsilhqot’in v British 
Columbia ruling marked the first time that a court ruled that aboriginal title over specific 
lands existed.17 This was, however, a non-binding decision wherein Justice Vickers 
could not legally award title due to the manner in which the case was argued. The 
decision stated that shared decision-making processes and consensus building activities 
are necessary components to meaningful consultation practices. This builds upon the 
insistence in Haida/Taku that consultation go beyond operational decisions and extend 
to strategic, policy and legislative decision-making.  
Justice Vickers went on to criticize the Crown for limiting their acknowledgement 
of aboriginal title during treaty negotiations and not approaching the ideas outside the 
process.18 In his words, “provincial policies either deny Tsilhqot’in title and rights or steer 
the resolution of such title into a treaty process that is unacceptable to the plaintiff.”19 
This decision’s significance is yet unknown as all three parties are currently appealing it. 
But the possible determination that title exists, and the insistence that consultation and 
accommodation includes strategic level decision-making is significant to the future of 
non-treaty agreements in BC. 
 
15 Newman, 59; Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult,  29. 
16 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 26. 
17 Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia,  2007 BCSC 1700; Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional 
Duty to Consult, 53; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 44. 
18 Meyers Norris Penny, LLP, Best Practices for Consultation and Accommodation, prepared for 
the New Relationship (Sep 2009): 6; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Financial and Economic 
Impacts of Treaty Settlement in British Columbia, prepared for the BC Treaty Commission 
(2009): 47; Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 55. 
19 Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia,  2007 BCSC 1700, para 1137. 
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The Wil’litswx v. BC (2008) case found that in honouring their duty to consult and 
accommodate, the Crown must acknowledge the distinct features of the aboriginal group 
with whom they are engaging.20 The province cannot justify cookie-cutter templates if 
they are not attuned to the complex differences of BC’s First Nations in non-treaty 
agreements. This expands upon the 2005 BC Supreme Court decision involving the 
Huu-ay-aht First Nations. This stated that good faith negotiations must go beyond any 
one-size-fits-all approach, and per capita allocations and population based formulas are 
not acceptable in satisfying the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.21 
The development of the common law around aboriginal rights and title demanded 
that the provincial government take proactive steps to honour these rights and title. In 
British Columbia, the vast majority of aboriginal rights and title have not been 
extinguished or altered into codified treaty rights, leaving them undefined. Because of 
this, federal and provincial governments looked to the treaty process to address these 
issues and approach reconciliation.  
2.2. BC Treaty Process 
The provincial government of British Columbia entered into the treaty process in 
1993 with the creation of the BC Treaty Commission. Litigation, court decisions, protests 
and blockades were significantly harming the provincial government’s political, social, 
and economic reputation. Negotiating tripartite treaties with Canada and First Nations 
was the best way to reconcile aboriginal claims while also ensuring economic certainty 
for provincial resource development. 
 
20 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 43. 
21 Huu-Ay-Aht First Nation et al. v. The Minister of Forests et al. (2005) BCSC 697; Ben Parfitt, 
True Partners: Charting a New Deal for BC, First Nations and the Forests We Share, 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Resource Economics Project (Vancouver, January 
2007): 20. 
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Uncertainty, in the economic sense is one of the main reasons that BC 
governments, whether NDP or Liberal, have pursued the treaty project. As SCC cases 
show, aboriginal rights and title to land do exist in BC and have not been extinguished by 
either treaties or assertion of Crown sovereignty. Title over land is not assured. Those 
who seek to invest major amounts of capital into resource development are wary to 
commit money to lands without clear property and development rights. As BC is a 
resource-dependent economy, anything that threatens the investing climate is highly 
undesirable for the provincial government. 
On the other hand, certainty over title to land provides stability that fosters 
investment and leads to long term economic benefits for the province.22 In order to 
obtain complete and final certainty, undefined aboriginal rights and title named in Section 
35 must be transformed into explicit treaty rights through the completion of a finalized 
treaty.23 A treaty modifies existing uncertain and un-codified rights into specific rights set 
out in the treaty. Certainty, and the stability and predictability that flow from it, remain 
one of the main drivers behind the provincial government’s desire to complete 
comprehensive treaties.24  
The British Columbia Treaty Process involves BC First Nations, the provincial 
government, the federal government and the BC Treaty Commission (the independent 
keepers of the process). The process is split up into a six-stages of negotiations with the 
ultimate goal of a comprehensive, modern treaty that becomes constitutionally protected 
under Section 35. The treaty process does not take place in a static, controlled 
environment; instead treaty negotiations occur within a changing social, political and 
 
22 Christopher Alcantara, “Old Wine in New Bottles? Instrumental Policy Learning and the 
Evolution of the Certainty Provision in Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements,” Canadian 
Public Policy 35.3 (Sep 2009): 382. 
23 Carole Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in the Midst of Uncertainty: Negotiating Aboriginal 
Rights and Title in British Columbia,” American Anthropologist 107.4 (2008): 586. 
24 Tony Penikett, Reconciliation: First Nation Treaty-Making in British Columbia, Douglas & 
McIntyre: Vancouver, 2008: 146. 
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legal landscape.25 This has led to some problems with the process since its creation in 
the early 1990s. 
Although the Supreme Court continually reiterates that negotiating is the 
preferred avenue for reconciliation, the BC Treaty Process has not worked as effectively 
or efficiently as all participants originally hoped. Problems arise due to the inflexibility of 
government mandates, power inequalties, incomplete First Nations participation, the 
extremely slow pace, and resulting increases in negotiations costs.26   
The federal and provincial governments negotiate treaties with a per capita land 
and cash settlement offer. This approach is fairly limited and it creates an inflexible 
position for the senior levels of government, as they cannot explore more creative 
solutions within treaties.27 Even when government negotiators toy with the idea of a new 
approach, they must seek approval of the mandate from central agencies. This requires 
much more time and slows down an already lengthy process. 
Christopher Alcantara, an aboriginal rights scholar, posits that Aboriginal groups 
occupy a much weaker position in negotiations and must accept western forms of 
knowledge, proof and discourse.28 In order to avoid damage to communities, lands and 
resources resulting from government actions, First Nations feel forced into negotiating 
these treaties as the only available option to protect their rights.29  
The BC treaty process, originally predicted to be completed in a twenty-year time 
frame, is still glaringly incomplete. To date, there are only two completed treaties 
stemming from the system: Tswwassen and Maa-Nulth. The Nisga’a Treaty was 
negotiated on similar principles but because negotiations started before the BC Treaty 
 
25 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 41. 
26 Christopher Alcantara, “To Treaty or Not to Treaty? Aboriginal Peoples and Comprehensive 
Land Claims Negotiations in Canada,” Publius 38.2 (Dec 2007): 347; 356. 
27 Penikett, 161-163; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 41. 
28 Alcantara, “To Treaty or Not to Treaty?” 350. 
29 Angela C. Angell and John R. Parkins, “Resource Development and Aboriginal Culture in the 
Canadian North,” Polar Record 47 (2011): 70. 
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Commission was established, it was negotiated outside the Treaty Commission process. 
Policy scholar Ben Parfitt has commented that “it is a rare feat to see modern-day 
treaties concluded in BC.”30 He then goes on to suggest that this “glacial pace of treaty 
talks” has sparked mounting resentment among many participating First Nations.31 
Today, one-third of BC First Nations have yet to even enter the process.32 
The treaty process in BC is very expensive. The cost is borne by BC taxpayers 
and First Nations as a whole. A 2008 report estimated that the project’s fifteen year 
costs totalled $1.1 billion.33 Some First Nations are withdrawing from the process 
because the amount of the negotiation loans they are taking out exceeds the expected 
potential cash settlement of the treaty.34 Additionally, if a First Nation formally drops out 
of the treaty process, they are expected to repay their loans immediately.35 The result is 
a stagnation, yet not complete cessation, of many treaty tables across the province. 
With all of these challenges in mind, the BC government developed policy tools 
outside of the treaty process to help encourage reconciliation and economic certainty.   
2.3. BC Policy Approaches Outside the Treaty Process 
In 2005, the BC government embarked on the New Relationship with First 
Nations. The First Nations Leadership Council, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, the BC 
Assembly of First Nations and the BC Premier met and agreed to a new policy 
 
30 Parfitt, 9. 
31 Ibid., 12. 
32 Penikett, 146. 
33 Mark Milke, Incomplete, Illiberal and Expensive: A Review of 15 Years of Treaty Negotiations in 
British Columbia and Proposals for Reform, The Fraser Institute Studies in Aboriginal Policy, 
July 2008:  
34 Alcantara, “Old Wine in New Bottles?” 356; Penikett,170. 
35 Penikett, 170. 
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framework based on government-to-government relationships.36 This policy directive 
aims to reduce uncertainty, litigation and conflict. 
The parties agreed to work together in an environment based on respect, 
recognition and reconciliation of Aboriginal title. 37 Additional guiding principles include 
openness, transparency and collaboration. The New Relationship document 
acknowledges the inherent right of aboriginal communities to make land use decisions. It 
also names an inherent right to the political structures necessary to make those 
decisions – which equates to an acknowledgement of self-government rights for First 
Nations.38 Significantly, this was completed outside and apart from the treaty process. It 
is  bilateral in nature, with no participation from the federal government. 
The New Relationship advanced the use of consultation and accommodation 
agreements as a policy tool. Unlike the previous approach of Interim Measures 
Agreements, wherein the province ceded eventual parts of the treaty settlement before a 
Final Agreement, these agreements existed completely outside of the treaty process. 
Now, Aboriginal groups in BC finally had an alternative to the stagnant treaty process in 
attempting to protect their interests, their lands and their rights that was legitimized by 
both sides.39  
These new policy instruments, referred to as accommodation agreements, non-
treaty agreements and consultation and accommodation agreements are shorter and 
more specific in topics. They offer time and money advantages over treaties and are 
more flexible than the rigid mandates associated with tripartite treaties.40 This provides 
Aboriginal groups with a promising option that will allow them some involvement in 
resource development in the immediate future.41 Accommodation agreements in BC 
 
36 Province of British Columbia, The New Relationship, March 2005. 
37 The New Relationship, 1; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 46. 
38 The New Relationship, 1. 
39 Alcantara, “To Treaty or Not to Treaty,” 357-358. 
40 Christopher Alcantara, “To Treaty or Not to Treaty?” 360. 
41 Ibid. 
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cover everything from large, broad land use plans, specific agreements related to 
infrastructure developments, addressing historical grievances over hydro projects, the 
2010 Olympics, and resource-specific topics like mining or forestry. These agreements 
allow for the provincial government to satisfy the Crown’s duty to consult and 
accommodate in the face of unproven aboriginal rights and title. A good agreement 
incorporates First Nation decision-making into consultation and accommodation 
measures and creates some economic certainty over the land base. 
Although there are many different types of consultation and accommodation 
agreements, this report narrows the analysis to three different types. The first is an 
agreement that is specific to particular resource development projects within a First 
Nation’s traditional territory. These are generally limited to the project in question and 
expire when the lifetime of the project ends. 
Sector-specific agreements are another type of non-treaty arrangements. These 
are usually applicable to one specific resource, most commonly forestry, and apply to a 
First Nation’s entire traditional territory. These are heavily policy driven from the 
provincial end. A standardized template is put forth to all the First Nations and they can 
either accept the deal or choose to go to court. These involve very little negotiations. 
Finally, there are comprehensive land use planning and management 
agreements. These have a variety of monikers, such as reconciliation protocols or 
strategic engagement agreements. These are broad, high-level commitments that are 
based on strategic land use plans agreed to by both the province and First Nations. 
These incorporate many consultation and accommodation measures into them, like 
resource revenue sharing, joint decision-making arrangements and control over place 
names. 
2.4. Content Options for Non-Treaty Agreements 
A good consultation and accommodation agreement satisfies the duty to consult 
and accommodate in a way that offers First Nations meaningful power in decisions 
regarding lands and resources in their traditional territory. It also must achieve provincial 
objectives of certainty and clarity over the land question. Generally, there are three 
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broad categories which lend to an agreement that satisfies the duty to consult and 
accommodate in a good way: relationship-building, certainty and economic provisions. 
Because of the wide variety in non-treaty agreements in BC, there is a correspondingly 
wide variety of content measures utilized to address consultation and accommodation. I 
describe some of these options that exist in agreements today by grouping them into the 
three categories: relationship-building, certainty and economic provisions. This is not an 
exhaustive list of content options, and is complimented by further analysis in the 
Literature Review below. 
2.4.1. Relationship-Building Content 
Certain consultation and accommodation measures allow for relationships built 
on trust and reconciliation between the two parties through a solid working relationship. 
Communication is one of the fundamental building blocks of consultation. Content 
regarding shared decision-making through co-management, whether in relation to lands 
and resources or socio-economic priorities, is very important in ensuring good 
consultation and accommodation. 
In Delgamuukw the Supreme Court stated that, “aboriginal title encompasses 
within it a right to choose to what ends a piece of land can be put.”42 With this in mind, 
non-treaty agreements that include some semblance of co-management, joint decision-
making or shared strategic planning are much more successful in uniting Aboriginal and 
government interests. Co-management is a concept that operates along a spectrum: 
from complete equal partnership in the decision-making to mere provision of aboriginal 
expertise and information to the government decision-makers. True co-management is 
based upon a government-to-government relationship that promotes respect and mutual 
recognition.43  
 
42 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010Para 168. 
43 Penikett, 216, Woodward & Company, Benefit Sharing Agreements in British Columbia: A 
Guide for First Nations, Businesses and Governments 2007, II-21.  
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Unlike the treaty process, co-management and co-jurisdiction models are based 
on recognition of aboriginal title rather than extinguishment and transformation.44 This 
amounts to aboriginal communities participating in land use decisions and resource 
development policy in their traditional territories with primacy for their views, ideas and 
concerns.45 Importantly, this does not have to be limited to just decisions regarding 
lands. The inclusion of socio-economic priorities is important in developing consultation 
and accommodation relationships. This ensures that the two parties work collaboratively 
to address social well-being of their communities in conjunction with the land-based 
economy. 
One of the best avenues to achieve co-management and joint decision-making, 
and thus enhance consultation and accommodation, is a Government-to-Government 
(G2G) Forum. This is a co-management structure where First Nations and the province 
are 50/50 partners in decision-making, development and implementation of land use 
plans.46 Equal representation to both the First Nation representatives and provincial 
officials means that both sides have the same amount of decision-making power over 
land and resources management. These bodies also have regularly scheduled 
meetings, often in the communities themselves. This ensures that consultation will 
continually take place, on a regular schedule, and will involve both parties at the ever-
important strategic high-level planning phases, as directed by the SCC in Haida/Taku. 
By working together through these joint forums, and the technical working groups 
they utilize, the parties build a more respectful relationship through dialogue and 
common understanding. Joint decision-making models are one of the preferable ways to 
ensure adequate and sustained consultation levels that lead to meaningful 
reconciliation.47 This satisfies one of the provincial government’s main objectives. In the 
Tsilhqot’in case, Justice Vickers confirmed that joint decision-making and consensus 
 
44 Penikett, 216. 
45 Meyers Norris Penny, LLP, 8. 
46 Parfitt, 6. 
47 Ibid., 36. 
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building are the building blocks of any successful, meaningful and productive 
consultation and accommodation agreement.48 
2.4.2. Certainty Assuring Content 
A good consultation and accommodation agreement includes content that 
promotes economic certainty over the land base. Economic certainty means that the 
British Columbia land question be settled by definitive measures that address jurisdiction 
over land management. Predictability and stability are main drivers in economic 
certainty.  
The term of an agreement is important to signifying long-term certainty. An 
agreement with an indefinite term means that it continues unchanged into the 
foreseeable future. This provides stability for First Nations, the provincial government, 
private industry and other stakeholders. All three parties can refer to the agreement and 
make sound economic, social or business decisions, free from doubt or uncertainty. 
Short-term agreements limited to five years or less do not guarantee any sort of 
economic certainty. The limited length of forestry and range non-treaty agreements are 
especially problematic in ensuring certainty on the land base over the long-term.49 By 
providing for high-level long term strategic planning, content in non-treaty agreements 
can extend the province’s duty to consult and accommodate into a predictable 
framework for the future. 
To work towards long-term certainty, an important inclusion in accommodation 
agreement is a land use plan. A clear vision that consists of First Nations community 
endorsed goals and values, a land-use plan gives strength to the aboriginal negotiating 
position while also providing a document that both the provincial government and the 
aboriginal community can work together towards implementing.50 Land-use plans can 
 
48 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 57. 
49 Parfitt, 28. 
50 Meyers Norris Penny, LLP, 8-11. 
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involve the establishment of no development zones, sustainability measures and the 
commitment to on-going environmental monitoring.51 They help to give guidance to lower 
level operational plans in areas such as forestry, mining, tourism and business 
development.52 This content measure offers predictability for all provincial government 
officials and relevant stakeholders looking for potential resource development 
possibilities.  
2.4.3. Economic Provisions 
A good non-treaty agreement includes economic and funding measures. In 
Delgamuukw, the SCC defined aboriginal title as having an inescapable economic 
aspect to it. Proper consultation and accommodation of potential infringements upon 
aboriginal rights and title must include some aspect of economic considerations. 
Economic consultation and accommodation measures can take the form of 
compensation payments, high level business participation through joint ventures or 
equity stakes or something more specific like employment, contracting or training 
commitments.53 These measures can provide adequate accommodation for potential 
rights and title infringements while also developing economic capacity within the 
aboriginal communities. Possible content options in this area are capacity funding, 
resource revenue sharing, employment and education provisions and business 
participation measures. 
Capacity to negotiate is a crucial aspect in regards to consultation and 
accommodation agreements.54 The human and financial resources to participate in 
negotiations and succeed at achieving the goals of a negotiation are extensive. For 
smaller First Nations, particularly those inexperienced in the treaty process, it can be 
 
51 Ibid., 29. 
52 Meyers Norris Penny, LLP, 42. 
53 Newman, 61. 
54 Parfitt, 40. 
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difficult to find and employ skilled negotiators. And without this skill and experience, they 
do not have much power at the bargaining table with the province. 
In the Platinex case, the Ontario Supreme Court ruled that the provincial 
government must provide certain funding for First Nations participation in consultation 
and accommodation. This ruling concerned mining development in the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug traditional territory. The Court stated that in order to 
uphold the honour of the Crown, they had to negotiate in good faith and this meant 
acknowledging the First Nation’s lack of capacity to adequately participate. Things like 
honoraria for elder and community leader participation and sharing of their traditional 
knowledge, legal fees, technical and professional salaries, travel subsidies and 
administrative fees should be provided for by the Crown within a non-treaty agreement.55  
Resource revenue sharing is another content option for any agreement that 
concerns resource extraction. This is a form of financial transfer that is directly correlated 
to the economic activity within a First Nation’s traditional territory. The province agrees to 
pay a certain amount of provincial revenues from resource extraction or resource rents 
to the First Nations.56 Resource revenue sharing helps involve the local First Nations 
while also accommodating for the potential infringements upon their rights due to 
disruptions caused by resource extraction. In BC, this a very valuable tool to ensure 
certainty over land prior to major resource projects.57 
Economically, a good consultation and accommodation agreement will include 
jobs, training, education and scholarships and capacity funding for administrative staff 
and management positions.58 Inclusion of First Nation members in resource extraction 
jobs is very important: in a Memorandum of Understanding mandated by the Ontario 
Court, both the Ontario provincial government, the private mining company Platinex and 
 
55 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 51. 
56 Parfitt, 33. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Meyers Norris Penny, LLP, 29. 
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the Kitchenuhmaykoosib	  Inninuwug First Nation agreed that members must be included 
as employees in plant operations.59 
Enhancing First Nations capacity through job training and education incentives 
will help promote another potential addition to accommodation agreements – that of 
business opportunities for aboriginal communities. These can include joint ventures, 
involvement as shareholders, contracting opportunities or financing for small-
businesses.60 This is an important step in First Nations community development and 
self-sufficiency. One example is the tie-in of forestry agreements with wood-processing 
business ventures. Allotting a First Nation a certain amount of harvestable timber can be 
turned into a real economic opportunity by helping develop a high-value wood product 
industry in their traditional territories.61 
 
59 Morellato, The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult, 50. 
60 Meyers Norris Penny, 29, 39. 
61 Parfitt, 26. 
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3. Literature Review 
I examine four key pieces of literature pertaining to consultation and 
accommodation agreements. Each provides this discussion with background to the 
problem but also possible solutions. Importantly, these pieces all offer suggestions as to 
what makes a good and valuable consultation and accommodation agreement.   
3.1. Tony Penikett’s Reconciliation: First Nation Treaty-
Making in British Columbia 
Tony Penikett has been involved in aboriginal negotiations for over twenty years 
in various capacities, including as the Premier of the Yukon and Deputy Minister of 
Negotiations in British Columbia. His 2008 book Reconciliation: First Nation Treaty-
Making in British Columbia offers not only a well-balanced assessment of the current 
situation regarding aboriginal rights and title in BC but some comments on moving 
forward with non-treaty agreements.  
Penikett criticizes the modern treaty process in BC as originating from strict 
government mandates based on a per capita land and cash transfer that leaves little 
room for the necessary give and take of negotiations. He argues that this cookie-cutter 
approach to treaties limits the creativity of negotiators on all sides of the table.62 
Although specifically regarding comprehensive land claim treaties in BC, this critique is 
important to keep in mind for how the province should approach negotiating non-treaty 
agreements. 
 
62 Penikett, 163, 170. 
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Penikett describes how interim measures agreements, a type of consultation and 
accommodation agreement that is linked with the treaty process are a beneficial policy 
tool. These agreements and the benefits they entail can be a building block to self-
government but can also create a distraction or diversion from the treaty process.63 
Interim measures agreements that work have three commonalities: consultation, 
accommodation, and capacity building. Through these three building blocks, alternate 
roads to certainty can be achieved by the province and the First Nations while waiting for 
treaties to be completed. These core tenets of interim measures agreements can be 
applied to accommodation agreements that exist outside of the treaty process. 
Penikett comments on two content options in non-treaty agreements seen 
recently in BC: co-management and joint decision-making. He says that co-jurisdictional 
arrangements like co-management and joint decision-making bodies “may be the best 
possible model for true accommodation of aboriginal ideas about land tenure and 
governance.”64 He notes that comprehensive land use planning agreements are “drifting 
surprisingly close to making co-jurisdictional arrangements” wherein the First Nations 
involved would be on equal footing with provincial decision-makers.65  
Agreements with co-management and joint decision-making help build 
government-to-government relationships and facilitate lands and resource management 
based on the recognition of aboriginal title, versus its extinguishment as seen in the 
treaty process. For this reason, these co-management inclusions make consultation 
accommodation agreements appealing for First Nations who find themselves frustrated 
with the land-selection treaty model currently employed by the BC Treaty Process.66 
 
63 Penikett, 148. 
64 Penikett, 216. 
65 Penikett, 216. 
66 Penikett, 217. 
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3.2. Meyers Norris Penny LLP’s Best Practices for 
Consultation and Accommodation 
The New Relationship Trust is an independent non-profit organization designed 
to build First Nations capacity so they can effectively participate in the New Relationship 
with the provincial government. It issued Best Practices for Consultation and 
Accommodation, a report prepared by Meyers Norris Penny (MNP) LLP in September 
2009. This offers suggestions on what First Nations should prioritize in seeking 
accommodation agreements. 
The report asserts that consultation and negotiations between the provincial 
government and First Nations in BC is very inconsistent.67 Still, the report encourages 
First Nations to participate as much as possible in consultation processes with the 
province. This, they say, is the first step to gaining a strong position in participating in 
land use decision-making and economic development decisions.68 Consultation, through 
agreements or through standard provincial policies, encourages a trustful working 
relationship between the government and First Nations.69 This benefits First Nations and 
also encourages a strong investment climate which in turn benefits businesses in BC. 
The report recommends that First Nations create a land use plan. They argue 
that it is an important addition to any consultation process with the province. A land use 
plan creates a clear, community endorsed vision that effectively communicates the goals 
and priorities of the individual First Nation.70 This also provides provincial negotiators a 
clear statement of objectives and goals prior to entering into non-treaty negotiations.  
Meyers Penny Norris, LLP offer suggestions for governments in approaching 
accommodation agreements. The report describes good accommodation as including 
 
67 Meyers Penny Norris, LLP, 20.  
68 Meyers Penny Norris, LLP, 8. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Meyers Penny Norris, LLP, 11. 
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many elements. These include minimizing infringement on aboriginal rights and title, 
balancing societal and First Nations interests, including First Nations in the decision-
making and fair compensation for any remaining infringements.71  
The report lists potential content inclusions that will make a good consultation 
and accommodation agreement. They can be loosely grouped into six broad categories.  
1. Environment and mitigation 
2. Training and employment 
3. Aboriginal Enterprises 
4. Financial Provisions 
5. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
6. Terms and Termination 
If all of these are taken into consideration, both the province and the First Nation will find 
the agreement a beneficial and enduring exercise in consultation and accommodation.72 
 
3.3. Canadian Centre For Policy Alternatives’ Critique 
on BC’s Forest and Range Agreements 
Ben Parfitt, writing for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, uses his 
report True Partners: Chartering a New Deal for BC, First Nations and the Forests We 
Share to critique the provincial government’s resource revenue sharing approach in the 
Forest and Range agreements. He acknowledges that the BC’s 2003 Forest 
Revitalization Plan is a good first effort at sharing forestry resource revenues with BC’s 
First Nations, but that it has some significant policy deficiencies.73  
 
71 Meyers Penny Norris, LLP, 29. 
72 Meyers Penny Norris, LLP, 39. 
73 It is important to note that this report was published in 2007 and since then there has been 
changes to the forestry and range agreements, most notably to the resource revenue sharing 
formula. 
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Referring to the province’s approach to resolving aboriginal rights and title 
issues, Parfitt muses that “consistency is not a word that springs to mind.”74 He notes 
that in consultation and accommodation, the province has resisted moving to a rights-
based compensation model. This ignores the reality of resource extraction’s actual 
effects in First Nations’ traditional territories.75 
In regards to non-treaty agreements as a whole, Parfitt believes that they are 
necessary to provide lasting benefits and assurance to First Nations in the absence of 
treaties. He argues that modern treaties as a policy tool, although vital to addressing 
past infringements of rights and title, are rare and unreliable.76 While he writes that 
“speed is not a word one usually thinks of when characterizing the provinces’ approach 
to accommodating First Nations’ interests,” he says that consultation and 
accommodation agreements enjoy a very quick and efficient pace, especially compared 
with the treaty process.77 
Parfitt takes particular issue with the cookie-cutter template approach to the 
forestry revenue sharing agreements, which he says ignores the on the ground realities 
of resource development.78 The formula employed by the provincial government that 
determines its timber and cash offers in Forest and Range agreements is fundamentally 
flawed. The province bases its offers on the population of the First Nation and not on the 
actual level of resource extraction in their traditional territory. The formula offers 
approximately $500 per capita per year and 30-54 cubic metres of timber. While this 
appears to treat all First Nations across the province equally, it does not take into 
account how logging activities affect First Nations traditional territories differently.79 
 
74 Parfitt, 10. 
75 Parfitt, 10, 37. 
76 Parfitt, 9. 
77 Parfitt, 11. 
78 Parfitt, 8. 
79 Parfitt, 5. 
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Another critique of these Forest and Range Agreements that Parfitt offers is that 
First Nations who have strong human resources and negotiating capacity can secure a 
much more profitable agreement than those without.80 He uses the example of the 
Gitanyow Hereditary Chiefs Agreement to highlight these issues. This agreement is 
similar to a standard Forest and Range Agreement. But it was borne out of a legal 
challenge so the Gitanyow had a much higher bargaining position. The Gitanyow 
secured a commitment from the province to engage in environmental restoration projects 
and the protection of culturally, archaeologically or historically significant areas. Part of 
the reasons for the higher standards of consultation and accommodation seen in this 
agreement, Parfitt maintains, come from the Gitanyow’s history of participating in 
blockades and/or legal challenges if they believed their interests were not being met.81 
In terms of non-treaty agreements, Parfitt recommends that the province move 
forward with policies that promote mutually agreed upon land use plans with First 
Nations. These land use plans should then be jointly implemented by a co-management 
body that sees First Nations as equal partners in lands and resource decisions. This 
approach demands a long-term commitment, and Parfitt critiques the five-year terms of 
Forest and Range Agreements as problematic to ensuring certainty over the long-term.82 
3.4. Legal Experts Woodward & Company Comment on 
Benefit Sharing in BC 
Woodward & Company, a Victoria based law-firm specializing in aboriginal legal 
matters published a report regarding what they call Benefit Sharing Agreements in 
British Columbia. They use the term Benefit Sharing Agreements (BSAs) as a general 
phrase to describe a written agreement that is the outcome of a consultation process 
about a proposed resource extraction, project or development that has the potential to 
 
80 Parfitt, 40. 
81 Parfitt, 37. 
82 Parfitt, 28. 
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impact aboriginal rights or interests. Although this report largely concerns Impact Benefit 
Agreements which are bilateral agreements between private third party interests and 
individual First Nations, it offers some good suggestions on how to achieve good 
consultation and accommodation measures in accommodation agreements between the 
province and BC First Nations.  
BSAs, the report states, are an effective policy tool that can achieve some 
certainty in the province and allow for resource development to proceed.83 The report 
warns that these non-treaty agreements are not a cure all solution for all of the complex 
social, political, legal, cultural and historic conflicts and uncertainties in the province. 
They will not achieve reconciliation on their own. But, they believe that each fairly 
negotiated agreement is one step forward in creating good relationships and a respectful 
environment for addressing aboriginal rights and title.84  
The report states that shared decision-making is a key content piece in BSAs. 
They describe a spectrum of shared decision making ranging from the low end, 
consultation, to the high end, joint management. At the high end of the spectrum is joint 
management. Here, there is equality in power for both provincial officials and First 
Nation representatives. This model is based on consensus decisions that moves to 
voting procedures if no consensus is reached.  
The report states that accommodation should include a financial or economic 
component. This can take a variety of forms, from cash transfers to payments based on 
a percentage of resource revenues that the province receives.85 This should not be 
based on a per population formula, like that used in the BC Ministry of Forestry and 
Range’s allocation. Instead, economic and financial accommodation should be based on 
an assessment of the strength of the right claimed and the degree of the infringement.86 
 
83 Woodward & Co., I-3. 
84 Woodward & Co., viii. 
85 Woodward & Co., II-29, II-31 
86 Woodward & Co., II-32. 
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Other strategies for offering financial accommodation outside of direct resource 
revenue sharing are available to governments. These include funding consultation costs, 
capacity building funds, economic development funds, community development funds, 
agreement implementation funds, environmental monitoring funds and funds for 
restoration projects.87 
Of the above, funding for First Nation participation is a paramount consideration. 
Financial capacity and funding for First Nations must be included in accommodation 
agreements. Although the Courts have yet to insist that a positive duty exists for 
governments to provide funding for aboriginal engagement, if governments wish to 
achieve good, workable arrangements, funding and capacity issues must be 
addressed.88  
They recommend that First Nations improve their participation in the economy of 
BC through consultation accommodation agreements. These will help First Nations 
improve their knowledge, capacity and experience. Successful non-treaty agreements 
include capacity funding for First Nation participation, clear communications between the 
parties involved, clear objectives, monitoring and reporting of results, and dispute 
resolution provisions. 
The report recommends that some standards for BSAs are implemented by the 
provincial government in the form of legislative and statutory frameworks. Likewise, they 
mention that the First Nations Leadership Council is also seeking minimum standards 
outlined in a policy or legislative framework.  
The report provides a jurisdictional scan where they cite examples from Australia 
that inform the consultation and accommodation agreements in BC. In Australia, having 
a set of legislated requirements for all BSAs proved to be very beneficial. Legislation 
strengthened the bargaining power of indigenous groups and moved relationships over 
 
87 Woodward & Co., II-32. 
88 Woodward & Co., II-4. 
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lands and resources closer to co-management. Additionally, a legislated framework 
provided for more effective environmental management, which remains a common 
objective for both provincial governments and First Nations in BC.89  
 
 
89 Woodward & Co., IV-3. 
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4. Interview Results 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives from four groups: 
• BC Government Employees 
• First Nations Leadership 
• Academic and Legal Scholars 
• Business and Industry Organizations 
I chose a semi-structured approach to my interviews to allow for a fluid dialogue 
between myself and the subject. I based my semi-structured interviews around three 
main themes to help guide the conversation and unearth the subject’s personal 
thoughts, knowledge and suggestions on the topic. Each theme has certain questions to 
begin the dialogue and help guide the conversation. The three themes were: 
• BC’s Accommodation Agreements 
• The Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
• Future Policy Frameworks Regarding Non-Treaty Agreements 
For each of the four different groups, I drafted a different set of framing questions 
to help explore each of these three themes. This allowed for a slight variance in how to 
pose the question for the specific respondent. 
4.1. Reoccurring Themes 
Four main themes arose in the majority of the interviews. The relationship 
between accommodation agreements and the BC Treaty Process, resource revenue 
sharing, the windfall concept and capacity issues were all identified by a majority of 
participants in the interviews. 
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4.1.1. Relationship to Treaty Process 
Interview respondents spoke about how consultation and accommodation 
agreements negotiated outside of the BC Treaty process have a variety of influences on 
the Treaty Process. Provincial representatives from MARR say that some First Nations 
have positive experiences with these agreements and are encouraged to continue 
working with the province through the treaty process. After such a long history of distrust 
between the parties, one provincial employee points out that these accommodation 
agreements allow for positive relationships to form. An example of this is the Ktunaxa 
Strategic Engagement Agreement, which has brought the sides much closer to 
completing their comprehensive land claim treaty. 
On the other hand, some First Nations look at what they can achieve through 
non-treaty agreements and take a ‘why bother’ approach to the treaty process. The 
situation with the Haida Nation is an example of this effect. Here, non-treaty agreements  
afford the Haida Nation a variety of benefits outside of the treaty process without 
entering into a formalized tripartite treaty. 
One provincial representative spoke of the improved pace of consultation and 
accommodation agreements when compared to treaties. First Nations members see the 
beneficial, tangible results of these agreements more immediately. And this, provincial 
representatives acknowledge, is one of the crucial advantages of non-treaty 
agreements. By negotiating smaller, more focused agreements, First Nations and the 
province improve their relationships and build trust moving towards reconciliation.   
Building upon this idea, Maria Morellato, one of Canada’s primary aboriginal legal 
experts, says that these agreements are a necessary part of the treaty process. As she 
sees it, the reconciliation offered by these agreements operates as an interim 
placeholder until the Crown and First Nations achieve a full and final settlement. These 
agreements allow for important restrictions on the provincial government’s resource 
extraction permitting process while comprehensive treaty negotiations take place. Rick 
Conte from the Association of Mineral Exploration BC agrees with this point, saying that 
accommodation agreements are the most effective bridge between interests while 
parties wait for broad-brush treaties to be completed.  
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Still with a positive view, yet in a different relation to the treaty process, Minister 
of the Environment Terry Lake, MLA of Kamloops – North Thompson finds these non-
treaty agreements to be a valuable asset. He says that particularly in his area of the 
interior, many First Nations are simply not interested in the tripartite treaty process and 
its land selection model. So the ability to build relationships with the province and 
negotiate agreements is important to securing some aspects of certainty outside of 
formal treaties.  
Scott Fraser, MLA of Alberni – Pacific Rim and the NDP Critic for Aboriginal 
Affairs states that these agreements can in fact stall the treaty process. He says that 
ever since Sophie Pierre, the Commissioner of the BC Treaty Commission, announced 
that the process isn’t working, the Premier has voiced her desire to focus on these one-
off accommodation agreements. He worries that this may leave the treaty process out in 
the cold, with little government support. 
Don Bain, Executive Director of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs 
(UBCIC), has a similar view on the provincial strategy of promoting non-treaty 
agreements. He notes Minister of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, Mary Polak’s 
recent submission to the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs as 
an indication that the province is choosing accommodation agreements instead of 
comprehensive treaties. He also cites the declining MARR budget for Final Agreements 
in the treaty process as evidence that the political will for the BC Treaty Process has 
waned significantly and that the provincial government is choosing to pursue non-treaty 
agreements to earn short-term certainty.  
4.1.2. Resource Revenue Sharing 
Many interviewees acknowledged resource revenue sharing as a policy 
instrument that can enter into non-treaty agreements. Resource revenue sharing is a 
form of financial transfer from the provincial government to First Nations. The intent is to 
provide money to First Nations that is directly proportionate to the amount of resource 
extraction within their traditional territories. True resource revenue sharing requires the 
province pay a certain percentage of the revenues, rents or taxes generated from 
mining, forestry or other natural resource projects. However, as described in Ben 
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Parfitt’s Partners for Change, the older generation of forestry and range agreements 
offered a form of resource revenue sharing based on a population formula.90 
BC MARR representatives spoke positively of resource revenue sharing, 
describing a few beneficial outcomes. First of all, like a clearly defined engagement 
framework, resource revenue sharing helps to involve First Nations, their needs and 
their priorities into the resource industry. Providing First Nations with a significant new 
revenue stream allows them to pursue socio-economic community enhancement 
objectives and lowers opposition to development. This helps the province by increasing 
the likelihood that projects will go forward, ensuring healthy economic benefits to all 
British Columbians. 
Don Bain, Executive Director of the UBCIC, warns that resource revenue sharing 
is not as financially significant as it was originally conceived to be. He notes that the 
resource revenue shared with the First Nations is actually a percentage of the taxes 
received by the province, not their entire revenue generated by the mine itself. 
Additionally, First Nations can only receive benefits from new resource developments in 
the program, severely limiting the amount of eligible nations in the province. 
Charles Porter, Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of Negotiations and Regional 
Operations for BC’s Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation (MARR) 
acknowledges resource revenue sharing as an important policy tool. However, one of 
the major problems with the program is that many mining projects do not begin to 
produce revenues and pay money to the province until many years into a project. Rick 
Conte, of the Association of Mineral Exploration British Columbia, also warns that the 
financial payments of resource revenue sharing are expected too early by First Nations 
in the mining process. This means that First Nations will see the physical degradation of 
their traditional territories long before they begin to see any financial payments from the 
 
90 See Literature Review Section 3.3 for more details on the older generation forestry agreements 
and their particular form of resource revenue sharing. 
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province. This hurts the validity and appearance of the program and reduces the interest 
of other First Nations to take part.  
Charles Porter and Zoe Younger, Vice President of Corporate Affairs for the 
Mining Association of BC, offer similar solutions that the province could consider to 
attend to this problem. First of all, the private sector could fill in the intermediate void. 
For the time between mine construction and mine profits, the mining company would 
provide initial community development programs like job training, education, daycare 
etc. These are all pragmatic options for the business community as it helps ensure a 
viable labour pool. In the end, Porter speaks of the potential for tripartite agreements 
surrounding mining developments wherein the private developer, First Nations and the 
province could come to an collaborative agreement based on sharing revenues and 
providing services.   
4.1.3. Windfall Concept 
Many key informants acknowledged the challenges presented by the windfall 
concept. The idea here is that First Nations in the province will not be treated equitably 
in consultation and accommodation agreements due to the geographic and economic 
realities of resource potential. While some aboriginal groups have traditional territories 
that may include a vast amount of natural resources, whether they are minerals, coal, 
forestry resources, fish and wildlife, some groups may have traditional territories with no 
opportunities for economically viable resource extraction. This creates an equity issue 
wherein the provincial government treats First Nations differently depending on the value 
of resources in their territories; the government does not afford aboriginal groups equal 
opportunities for accessing, negotiating and finalizing non-treaty agreements. 
Charles Porter, of MARR, says that a First Nation who lives in an area of 
extraordinary riches will be a higher priority for provincial officials than a First Nation who 
does not enjoy this geographic position. Maria Morellato echoes this by saying that First 
Nations without a proximity to natural resources do not garner any attention from the 
provincial government, leaving them out of the non-treaty agreement discussions. Thus, 
the windfall concept is a major factor in determining the allocation of non-treaty 
agreement resources and this is a largely inescapable reality.  
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Scott Fraser, NDP Critic for Aboriginal Affairs, expands on this idea by arguing 
that the BC Government is effectively dividing the province’s First Nations into have and 
have nots, whether intentionally or not. He says that reconciliation efforts cannot be 
based on wealth and resource distribution, as is the current practice. This will result in 
some nations becoming unfairly wealthier than others. Reconciliation should be about 
righting past wrongs and about invoking the concept of justice, Fraser says, and not on 
resource values.  
The province, Fraser maintains, has effectively shut out the great majority of First 
Nations from the negotiating table and program delivery. By concentrating on the First 
Nations who enjoy the windfall of natural resources in their territory, the province leaves 
other First Nations to their own devices. This has resulted in an unfair process where 
aboriginal groups with limited capacity are forced to stand up to big multi-national 
corporations in order to see what they can get. This puts the First Nations at an 
extremely disadvantaged bargaining position from the outset, and they receive little help 
from the province.  
4.1.4. Capacity Issues 
Interviewees continually pointed to BC First Nations’ lack of capacity as a major 
problem in the negotiating and implementing of consultation and accommodation 
agreements. A provincial representative from MARR acknowledges that some First 
Nations, with a highly developed and educated leadership council are in a better position 
to get a strong agreement.  
Maria Morellato, an aboriginal law expert, points to capacity issues as one of the 
main problems in the province’s relations with aboriginal people today. She says that 
having the human resources and financial capacity to do a proper strength of claim 
assessment can be taxing on some aboriginal groups. A strength of claim assessment 
uses biological, geographic, historical, archaeological, and ethnographic data, along with 
oral histories and mapping techniques to determine the strength of aboriginal rights and 
title claims in a First Nation’s claimed traditional territory. Without this assessment, which 
requires a large amount of financial and human resources, they find it very difficult to 
have any negotiating power with the provincial government. Maria says that in order to 
 35 
rectify this problem, the province must provide First Nations with more financial capacity 
prior to and during negotiations. She references the Platinex case in Ontario, where the 
court ordered the province to provide funding to the First Nation so that they could 
adequately participate in the consultation process. Despite this ruling in Ontario, the BC 
government has yet to make any substantial changes to their consultation funding 
allocations for First Nations. 
A MARR employee pointed to lack of capacity as a sensitive subject in 
negotiating non-treaty agreements. Often, First Nations are eager to sign agreements 
which require an enormous amount of human resources capacity without fully 
acknowledging how much this will effect their small government structures. The 
provincial representative said that it is hard to explain to the First Nations that entering 
into complicated co-management or joint decision-making boards may strain their 
already limited resources without sounding patronizing or paternalistic.  
4.2. Interview Highlights By Sector 
4.2.1. Provincial Government Employees 
Charles Porter, Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Negotiations and 
Regional Operations of BC’s Ministry for Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation 
provided an excellent summary of BC’s policies regarding non-treaty agreements as well 
as a beneficial insight into the motives and drivers of provincial policy. 
Porter acknowledges that Strategic Engagement Agreements (SEAs) are a 
viable policy tool, but are not standardized. SEAs are an umbrella term for the wide 
variety of consultation and accommodation agreements signed by the province. These 
are not designed to be static agreements: many acknowledge the abilities to grow over 
time and add in more content. They can utilize resource revenue sharing content and 
become Economic and Community Development Agreements, like the SSN’s agreement 
examined in the case studies, or they can also add Government-to-Government Forums 
and become reconciliation agreements, like we see with the Haida Reconciliation 
Protocol.  
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While Porter speaks very positively of the effect of SEAs and the benefits they 
bring both for aboriginal populations and British Columbians in general, he does 
acknowledge that there are some strict caveats to whether or not his ministry will pursue 
these agreements. Porter uses a strictly pragmatic, results oriented approach in 
determining criteria for whether or not to move forward on negotiating these agreements.  
First of all, Porter says there must be some economic benefit to the province to 
pursuing an agreement. If there are no potential for economic opportunities in the 
traditional territory, negotiations will not take place. Secondly, he acknowledges the 
importance of other ministries’ support in negotiating and implementing SEAs. This is 
because much of the implementation and on-the-ground work specified in these 
agreements will be taken over by other statutory decision-makers in the government. 
Thirdly, Porter says that he must have positive evidence that the First Nations in the 
area will be able to successfully work together in a collaborative way in order to achieve 
the measures set out in these agreements. If aboriginal groups have questions over 
leadership, representation and differing allegiances, the province will not attempt a deal 
and risk making it with the wrong group of representatives.  
Porter provides reasons for these strict criteria. He says that the province only 
has so much negotiating capacity, funds and time to strike these deals. He does not 
want to waste his staff’s time, or the taxpayers’ money, negotiating a deal over years 
and years of stalled talks. He says that, unlike the treaty process, he demands a quick 
turn around time for negotiations. He says that the province is not pursuing absolute 
perfection in these non-treaty agreements; all have clauses that allow for program 
evaluation and modification over time. So the priority is for getting an agreement that 
works for both parties, although there may be concessions or omissions on either side.  
I interviewed three provincial government employees who are all employed within 
MARR and who all have extensive experience with non-treaty agreements. MARR 
representatives identified two priorities for their staff in negotiating these agreements: 
predictability and ease of implementation.  
When asked to provide a few must haves for consultation and accommodation 
agreements in the future, one MARR representative said that an efficient, clear 
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engagement framework is paramount. In terms of predictability, the inclusion of an 
engagement framework in non-treaty agreements provides a conventional outline of the 
process for both provincial and proponent representatives to move forward on resource 
extraction projects. By identifying what First Nations expect out of the consultation 
process, industry third parties are more aware of time frames and expectations on their 
end, leading to increased certainty in BC’s resource sector.  
Another MARR employee pointed to the importance of detailed dispute resolution 
processes outlined in the agreement. As well, a focus on monitoring and evaluation of 
the agreement was named by a provincial employee to ensure the effectiveness of these 
consultation and accommodation agreements. 
One provincial representative identified implementation as a major challenge 
arising from the variation in non-treaty agreements. For regional operational staff, it is 
difficult to implement various processes outlined in these agreements in one area, if 
different territories have different rules. MARR employees pointed to the issue of 
overlapping agreements as a potential problem for implementation staff. One provincial 
representative said that having variety across regions is okay for implementation 
purposes, but variety within a geographic region can cause problems for staff that make 
the content of the agreements difficult to achieve. Another provincial employee stated 
that variability in these agreements is a good thing – as long as it is a result of 
negotiations. They maintained that consistency across agreements is important, but that 
this does not imply the need for identical non-treaty agreements. 
4.2.2. First Nations 
Don Bain is the Executive Director of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC). 
The UBCIC is an intertribal organization which now represents 104 out of BC’s 203 First 
Nations. Bain believes that the BC Treaty Process is dead and that the provincial 
government accepts this. In its absence, the government utilizes consultation and 
accommodation agreements as policy options that guarantee short-term certainty. In his 
view, the province is using these agreements to continue their ultimate aim of reducing 
legal liabilities while allowing for operational stability for resource developments in BC.  
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Bain was highly critical of the forestry and range agreements, in all their various 
forms over the years, as completely ignoring the realities of aboriginal rights and title. 
These agreements are based on a per population formula, which Bain states was 
formulated out of thin air by senior government bureaucrats. Allotting accommodation for 
forestry work in a traditional territory through a cookie-cutter approach ignores what the 
courts have been consistently saying– that consultation and accommodation must be 
proportional to the perspective infringement on rights or title.  
Bain says that despite the inherent problems with forestry and range 
agreements, First Nations in BC often sign them. This is rooted in a fundamental lack of 
First Nations capacity. When faced with a financial inability to assert their title in either 
costly negotiations or litigation, smaller First Nations in BC often accept these deals with 
the province. As Bain explains, First Nation’s rights and title are not going anywhere and 
a relatively short five-year deal can provide necessary economic inputs into their 
communities. 
Guujaw, President of the Council of the Haida Nation responded on the value of 
accommodation agreements for the Haida people. He stated that the relatively 
predictable land selection model of the BC Treaty Process is undesirable. By trading 
their aboriginal title for 5-10% of the land on Haida Gwaii, the Haida Nation effectively 
surrender traditional lands where their people have lived since time immemorial. The 
Haida will not do so. 
Guujaw points to the environmental protected area clauses in their non-treaty 
agreements that allow the Haida to retain and practice their aboriginal rights as well as 
jointly manage the lands along with province. This is a positive starting point for 
reconciliation. The Gwaii Haanas Agreement (1993), signed nearly twenty years ago is a 
leading example of this. Signed with Parks Canada, this is a significant milestone in the 
negotiation of non-treaty agreements. It was one of the first times that the Crown and a 
First Nation established a joint decision-making framework concerning protected areas. 
Although Guujaw is only one leading voice, representing one nation, his opinion is 
extremely valuable.  
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4.2.3. Aboriginal Legal Experts 
Maria Morellato is a practicing lawyer with a long history in aboriginal legal issues 
and various kinds of negotiations and litigation. Maria believes that the lack of uniformity 
in these non-treaty agreements is not an issue because it is necessary to avoid a one-
size-fits-all situation. Positives of this variance include the First Nation’s ability to 
articulate their particular interests, secure accommodation measures and build their own 
desirable relationship with the provincial government. In this way, they can protect their 
own priorities through an individually designed agreement. 
Bonnie Docherty, of the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University 
and co-author of the report “Bearing the Burden: The Effects of Mining on First Nations 
in British Columbia,” spoke of the importance of land use plans for First Nations. During 
the course of her research in BC, she found that land use plans are really critical on 
multiple levels, for First Nations, for the provincial government and for industry, in 
providing clarity in moving forward. She says that since the BC Government does not 
formally recognize these plans, many First Nations have no incentive to create these 
complex documents. She suggests giving legal weight and authority to jointly agreed 
plans would create a much more inclusive environment in BC. 
Docherty’s report, “Bearing the Burden” offers many suggestions for improving 
aboriginal consultation and accommodation in BC – through both agreements and broad 
policies. When asked, she said that the preferable avenue for evincing changes in BC is 
through legislation. In bringing about reforms, legislation is the preferable measure 
because it is binding, it carries a certain weight and it is the hardest to change. But, 
Docherty maintains, any reform, even at the policy level would be a positive step.  The 
key elements of reform that she proposes are a clearly defined consultation process that 
begins early on in the process and a grounding in the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.  
4.2.4. Politicians 
I interviewed two politicians, one from each of the main parties in BC’s politics. 
Each has a portfolio that involves working with aboriginal non-treaty agreements so both 
interviews were very informative. Being from two different political persuasions, one was 
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very critical of the approach of the Liberal government, and the other one was much 
more positive in his assessment. 
Terry Lake, BC’s Minister of the Environment is also the Liberal MLA of 
Kamloops – North Thompson. The New Gold New Afton mine project falls within Lake’s 
geographic constituency. He believes the relationship that has developed between the 
Stk’emlupsemc of the Secwepemc Nation (SSN), the New Gold mining company and the 
province is a good one. The SSN receive benefits such as a new revenue source and 
training and employment opportunities. The non-aboriginal constituents get the 
economic benefits of a nearby mine project, for example, new jobs closer to home and 
economic spin offs.  
Lake says that the Economic and Community Development Agreement (ECDA) 
between the province and the SSN have provided his constituents with a necessary 
balance between First Nations interests and the need for economic development in the 
form of mining. He believes that this is important not only in his constituency but in all of 
British Columbia. He maintains that a balance must be achieved that allows for 
responsible, sustainable resource development even in the face of legal uncertainties 
regarding aboriginal consultation. Lake believes that this sort of framework could be 
used as model or template moving forward. Based on its successes so far, he says that 
this mutually beneficial relationship gives all sides of the equation confidence in moving 
forward.  
Scott Fraser is the MLA of Alberni – Pacific Rim and the NDP Critic for Aboriginal 
Affairs. Fraser has a long history of involvement in aboriginal issues in BC and his take 
on these accommodation agreements is quite different from Terry Lake’s. Although we 
cannot reduce all the differences to a simple conflict between Liberal and NDP values, it 
is interesting to note the disparity and highlight the differences. During the interview, 
Fraser elaborated on themes of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and the Liberal’s strategy in addressing non-treaty accommodation agreements. 
Scott Fraser believes that any provincial government policy regarding aboriginal 
relations in BC should use the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UN 
DRIP) as its formulating guideline. Although not law, it should be understood by 
 41 
provincial decision-makers as a collective value statement that defines existing 
relationships on aboriginal traditional territories. He underscores the importance of 
governments obtaining “free, prior and informed consent,” prior to any resource 
developments on indigenous traditional lands.  
Fraser takes a critical view on the current provincial government approach to 
non-treaty agreements. Specifically, he says that the variety in them is problematic and 
leads to an inequality amongst First Nations. He says that one-off agreements in 
particular, designed for specific situations, lack a binding consistency to ensure equality 
and fairness. These agreements are done in a vacuum and are corrupted by the need to 
push resource development, leading to problems in the future. This fast and easy 
approach of the provincial government is not fair or consistent with the First Nations in 
BC. When asked about potential standards that the government could implement in 
regards to these agreements, Fraser again pointed to the UN DRIP as a starting point 
for developing basic policies. 
He argues that the province is employing a “divide-and-conquer” strategy with 
accommodation agreements. This involves only negotiating with the eager First Nations 
and dividing up territory into provincially controlled lands, ready for resource 
development. This involves pitting aboriginal groups against each other in the struggle to 
get shares of resource revenues and even divides First Nations amongst themselves. 
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5. Research Findings 
The case studies cover three types of non-treaty agreements: comprehensive 
land and resource management agreements, project-specific agreements and forest and 
range agreements. The six agreements I examined are as listed below. 
1. Haida Nation Kunst’aa guu - Kunst’aayah Reconciliation Protocol 
2. Taku River Tlingit Whóoshtin yan too.aat - Land and Resource 
Management and Shared Decision-Making Agreement 
3. Tahltan Nation Government-to-Government and Northwest 
Transmission Line Negotiation Framework Agreement 
4. Stk’emlúpsemc of the Secwepemc Nation Economic and Community 
Development Agreement 
5. Ktunaxa Nation Forest Revenue Sharing Agreement 
6. Penticton Indian Band of the Okanagan Nation Interim Agreement on 
Forest and Range Opportunities 
To evaluate the relative strength of the consultation and accommodation 
measures contained in different agreements I use three broad categories to assess 
these case studies. I derive these three categories from background research and 
literature reviews. Assurance of certainty, contributions to relationship building between 
the parties, and support for economic development by the First Nations are the three 
main positive factors in a good consultation and accommodation agreements. I assess 
each of the case studies on how well each agreement satisfies these three criteria. After 
the individual assessments, I compare and contrast the agreements to come to 
conclusions about the variability in consultation and accommodation agreements in BC.  
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I use a high, medium, and low scale to assess each of the consultation and 
accommodation categories in each of the agreements. This is to standardize the 
evaluation and allow for some comparison. A high rating means that the agreement 
includes the best consultation and accommodation content possible in the particular 
category. A medium rating means that the agreement has some important content but is 
lacking other significant measures. A low rating means that the agreement is lacking in 
consultation and accommodation measures within that particular category. This is a 
subjective scale that is meant to provide a qualitative, informative comparison of the 
case studies. It is not intended to be a definitive statement on the pros and cons of such 
agreements. 
5.1. Haida Nation Kunst’aa guu – Kunst-aayah 
Reconciliation Protocol 
The Haida Nation Kunst’aa guu - Kunst’aayah Reconciliation Protocol is a 
comprehensive land and resource agreement. It offers the aboriginal communities on 
Haida Gwaii a substantial  voice in determining if, when, how and by whom the 
resources in their traditional territories are extracted. The Haida Reconciliation Protocol 
focuses on forest tenuring practices, carbon offset programs and land use management 
plans relating to sustainable forestry. This comprehensive land use agreement scores 
highly in all three requirements of a good consultation and accommodation agreement: 
relationship building, certainty and economic provisions. 
The Haida Reconciliation Protocol approaches relationship building in the form of 
shared decision-making over all land and resource use issues. This means that the 
Haida Gwaii Management Council (HGMC), the co-management body, is made up of 
equal amounts Haida members and provincial representatives. Built on a consensus 
model, the HGMC is responsible for implementing and amending the Strategic Land Use 
Plan that the parties agreed to in 2007. It is also the primary venue for consultation in 
regards to provincial Crown actions.  
Another move towards relationship building in the Reconciliation Protocol is the 
commitment on both sides to improve the socio-economic wellness of the Haida people. 
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The agreement calls for a joint approach by both parties that focuses on the health and 
wellness of children and families on Haida Gwaii. Both parties agree that economic 
development is closely related to the social and environmental well-being of the 
communities. These content options earn this agreement a high score in the 
relationship-building category. 
In terms of certainty, the Reconciliation Protocol offers long-term economic 
certainty due to the indefinite expiration and solid legal framework. By not applying an 
expiration date to the document, there is no fear that in five years the deal will lapse. 
This allows provincial officials, private industry and the Haida people the opportunity to 
plan for economic development in the long term, as they can all be assured of the 
stability of the agreement.  
Unique to non-treaty agreements across the province, the Haida Reconciliation 
Protocol is accompanied by a commitment to place it within the province’s statutory 
framework. The BC Minister of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation agreed to 
recommend a legislative basis for the shared decision-making components of the 
agreement to the BC legislature.91 The Haida Nation reciprocally agreed to recommend 
to their House of Assembly a similar piece of legislation. This is a powerful step in the 
implementation and validity of the HGMC co-management body. Developing a statutory 
framework for the HGMC allows it all the power and authority needed to make all of its 
relevant decisions. This helps to ensure long-term certainty over economic potential on 
Haida Gwaii and earns the agreement a high rating for certainty. 
The Reconciliation Protocol has significant economic provisions. These include a 
$10,000,000 payment for forest tenure acquisition as well as an annual payment of 
$600,000 per year in order to implement the agreement. Additionally, the agreement 
includes a signing payment of $200,000. In terms of resource revenue sharing, the 
Reconciliation Protocol commits the provincial government to sharing revenues from any 
 
91 See Province of British Columbia, Bill 18-2010 Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act. 
<http://www.leg.bc.ca/39th2nd/1st_read/gov18-1.htm> 
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new major natural resource projects in the future. Combined, these economic measures 
help to strengthen the consultation and accommodation measures since the agreement 
allows the Haida to use the monetary funds to participate in structures like the HGMC. 
This agreement scores highly in economic measures. 
The Haida Reconciliation Protocol has very good consultation and 
accommodation measures that provide for the inclusion of the Haida people into 
decision-making on their traditional territories. It includes some very important 
consultation and accommodation content that provides the Haida with more input in the 
development of their traditional territories than virtually any other First Nation in the 
province. The content includes well-developed, clearly outlined relationship-building 
measures like co-management bodies and attention to socio-economic issues. It also 
provides for long-term economic stability through its predictable framework and lack of 
an expiration date. The grounding of the agreement in statutory provincial legislation 
also signals all stakeholders that this agreement is here to stay, for the long-term. 
Economically, the agreement includes necessary funding for implementation of the 
measures outlined above. It also provides the necessary funds to purchase an important 
woodlot within their territory. The Haida Reconciliation Protocol overall scores highly in 
all consultation and accommodation categories. 
5.2. Taku River Tlingit Whóoshtin yan too.aat - Land and 
Resource Management and Shared Decision-
Making Agreement 
The Taku River Tlingit Whóoshtin yan too.aat - Land and Resource Management 
and Shared Decision-Making Agreement is a comprehensive land use agreement that 
allows for the Taku River Tlingit (TRT) to have a definitive say in resource developments 
and land use in their traditional territories . Because of their geographic and economic 
realities, the Taku River Tlingit have an agreement that addresses land use planning, 
protected areas, commercial recreation opportunities and potential mining developments 
in TRT traditional territories.  
 46 
The TRT agreement has high rated relationship building mechanisms that allow 
for both parties to collaboratively and respectively work together. There are three 
separate levels for shared decision-making: a Government-to-Government (G2G) 
Forum, an Engagement Framework and Joint Initiatives. The creation of a G2G Forum is 
a highly formalized arena for collaborative, strategic level land use decision-making. It 
consists of equal representation from both provincial officials and TRT representatives. 
In the G2G Forum, the parties work together to implement the jointly developed land use 
plan for the area, create joint and technical working groups to attend to specific matters 
and make formal recommendations to statutory decision-makers. This allows for high 
level, strategic consultation measures to take place between the provincial Crown and 
the TRT. 
Although the TRT also has a co-management body in the form of the G2G 
Forum, it also explicitly outlines consultation approaches in its Engagement Model. 
Similar engagement models are employed by the BC Government in other non-treaty 
agreements. These standardize the consultation process and create clear guidelines for 
any potential government decisions within a certain First Nations asserted traditional 
territory. The TRT Engagement Model is comprehensive and wide-ranging. It includes 
four different levels of engagement, defines each level and provides relevant 
consultation activities for each level. This helps to standardize the relationship between 
the two parties and develop a common line of communication. Because of this content, 
the TRT agreement scores a high rating in the relationship building-category. 
The ongoing nature of the agreement and omission of a formalized expiration 
date provides for economic certainty over lands in the long-term. Together, the explicit 
land use plan and Engagement Framework provide sector-specific details on what sort 
of particular actions will require what levels of consultation and accommodation. This is 
an excellent approach to consultation that provides a clear framework that all 
government, industry and First Nation participants can understand and follow. This 
predictability and longevity are two of the main determinants in creating the kind of 
economic certainty that the provincial government is seeking. This results in a high 
ranking for certainty measures in the document, 
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In terms of financial or economic accommodation, the TRT agreement does 
provide for some important funding mechanisms. Over a three year initial period, the BC 
Government will pay the TRT $600,000 in total to implement the terms of the agreement. 
This is to ensure their effective participation in the G2G Forum and consultation 
measures.92 Additionally, the provincial government commits to developing resource 
revenue sharing agreements for any future major resource development projects in TRT 
territories. Implementation and resource revenue funding content gives the agreement a 
high score in economic consultation and accommodation provisions. 
The Taku River Tlingit agreement, like other broadly based comprehensive land 
use agreements, highly satisfies the three factors that go into a good consultation and 
accommodation agreement. The G2G Forum, supplemented by two other avenues of 
joint-decision making allows for a continual TRT voice in land use planning and 
consultation at the strategic level. The Engagement Model not only helps build 
relationships between the two parties, it also provides for economic certainty around 
land use for all British Columbians in the form of a clearly outlined framework for 
consultation measures. This predictability, and the long-term nature of the agreement 
mean that there will be very little economic uncertainty regarding potential land use 
developments in the area. And in terms of economic or financial provisions, the 
provincial government provides important implementation funding to ensure that the TRT 
can fully participate in the G2G Forum and in the Engagement Framework, helping to 
ensure their long-term success. 
 
92 Another important consideration in the economic category is the philanthropic addition to the 
Taku River Tlingit’s implementation budget. TIDES Canada, a non-profit charitable 
organization responsible for the conservation effort in the Great Bear Rainforest among other 
things, committed $5 million towards the TRT implementation of their land use agreement. 
The money is to be used to ensure that the G2G joint decision-making forum has all the 
necessary resources to ensure the social, cultural, environmental and economic health of the 
Taku River Tlingit traditional territories.  
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5.3. Tahltan Nation Government-to-Government and 
Northwest Transmission Line Negotiation 
Framework Agreement 
 
The Tahltan Nation Government-to-Government and Northwest Transmission 
Line Negotiation Framework Agreement is a project-specific agreement. Here, the 
provincial government and the Tahltan Nation of north-western BC agree to work 
together and share in benefits from the extension of the British Columbia Hydro 
Northwest Transmission Line (NTL). In terms of consultation and accommodation, it has 
highly rated relationship-building provisions, medium certainty provisions and low 
economic provisions. 
It is important to note that the Tahltan agreement is a framework agreement. It is 
not binding and the final agreement is still in negotiations. With this in mind, I approach 
this case study as informative and not definitive. I use its content as a placeholder for 
what the agreement will eventually include. In place of a finalized agreement, it informs 
the discussion on what these agreements can and strive to include. 
In the relationship-building category, the Tahltan Framework agreement includes  
effective measures to involve the First Nations in the planning, construction, operation, 
and maintenance phases of the NTL project. This relationship is based on recognizing 
and respecting the authority of both sides as legitimate governments. The Tahltan 
agreement includes the development of a Government-to-Government (G2G) Forum. 
Like other G2G Forums, it consists of equal representation from the province and from 
the Tahltan Nation. Its stated objectives are increasing certainty over the land base, 
effectively managing lands and resources, structuring consultation and accommodation 
approaches, improving Tahltan governance capacity, managing socio-cultural impacts of 
development in the community, and improving the economic strength of the entire north-
western corner of British Columbia. To achieve these goals, the G2G Forum works 
together through collaborative decision-making and joint-monitoring of the project at 
hand. 
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There exists also a commitment from both sides to enhance the socio-economic 
well-being of the aboriginal groups and ensure a healthy community. The Tahltan 
agreement stresses managing socio-cultural changes that infrastructure development 
inevitably brings. The Tahltan agreement acknowledges that the development of the 
NTL will bring about an influx of people into the area and will generate revenues for the 
region. This increase in social and economic activity will result it many social and cultural 
changes for the Tahltan community. The agreement iterates the need for a collaborative 
approach between BC and the Tahltan to manage and work with community 
developments. This content works to give the Tahltan Framework Agreement a high 
rating for relationship-building consultation and accommodation measures. 
The Tahltan Framework agreement provides a moderate amount of economic 
certainty for the territories in question. The agreement includes a large scope of topics, 
from energy plans to developments of fish and wildlife management structures. This 
provides some certainty, in the forms of predictability over land management and 
jurisdiction, for a wide variety of issues that goes beyond the scope of just the NTL 
project. The Tahltan agreement does not specifically outline any engagement or 
consultation framework within the agreement. Instead, it includes developing a clear 
engagement framework as one of the many objectives of the G2G Forum, but until this is 
completed, the agreement lacks long term predictability for all parties. 
The Tahltan agreement has minimal mention of financial or economic 
accommodation stemming from the NTL development, giving it a low score in this 
category. It does mention the potential for resource revenue sharing for new major 
project developments in the territory. It does not stipulate any implementation funding 
although it does mention the need for financial resources required for Tahltan 
participation in the agreement. Instead, the agreement acknowledges that a separate 
agreement will be signed in the future between BC Hydro and the Tahltan. This will be 
an Impact Benefit Agreement without provincial government involvement. Like other 
agreements between First Nations and third parties, it will remain confidential as to the 
actual values accrued to the aboriginal communities.  
Because of the framework nature of the Tahltan agreement, it is difficult to make 
any definitive conclusions about the actual rating of consultation measures that will 
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appear in the final agreement. However, based on the goals of the framework 
agreement, it is clear that it will have high scoring relationship building and medium 
scoring certainty provisions to help make it a robust consultation and accommodation 
agreement that gives the Tahltan a major and enduring role in land use planning 
decisions. A G2G Forum, commitment to socio-economic well-being, wide ranging scope 
and the potential for an engagement framework are all positive signs. As well, in 
economic terms, the commitment to share provincial resource revenues is another good 
measure. The lack of mention of implementation funding is a concern, although the 
agreement does refer to a private Impact Benefit Agreement with BC Hydro. This will 
include alternative sources of funding, but it is a confidential document so the outcome is 
unknown.  
5.4. Stk’emlúpsemc of the Secwepemc Nation 
Economic and Community Development Agreement 
The Stk’emlúpsemc of the Secwepemc Nation Economic and Community 
Development Agreement addresses the New Afton Mine project just west of Kamloops, 
British Columbia. This is a project-specific agreement that covers the mine’s entire 
twelve year life span. Intensive mining in this project will have significant, acute 
environmental affects for the traditional territories of the Stk’emlúpsemc of the 
Secwepemc Nation (SSN). In terms of strength of consultation and accommodation 
measures, the agreement has high scoring relationship-building content, medium 
certainty provisions and medium economic contributions. 
The Stk’emlúpsemc Economic and Community Development Agreement (ECDA) 
agreement encompasses relationship-building aspects that effectively bring the 
provincial government and the SSN together through shared goals. The agreement 
acknowledges that the relationship between the parties must be based upon a 
government-to-government approach that recognizes the authority of the others. A 
shared decision-making body is an extension of this relationship. In the spirit of joint 
decision-making, the Stk’emlupsemc ECDA creates a Mine and Minerals Joint Resource 
Committee. This committee has a more limited mandate than a territory wide shared 
decision-making body like a G2G Forum. But, like a G2G Forum, is also grounded in 
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shared decision-making and a strong framework for consultation and accommodation. 
The Mines and Minerals Joint Resource Committee also stresses information sharing as 
important to the communication between the two parties. 
Another strong aspect of relationship building is the commitment to improve 
socio-economic conditions. The two participating First Nation bands of the SSN  intend 
on using the resource revenues guaranteed by the mine project to fulfill their goal of 
closing the socio-economic gap between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. They agree to 
create a community plan to outline their specific objectives and participate in yearly 
reporting practices to show how they are using the funds to achieve progress. Because 
of these content measures, the agreement scores highly in the relationship-building 
category.   
The SSN ECDA has a low amount of certainty. It is limited to one specific natural 
resource in question, and is only valid for the duration of the mine. This reduces the 
certainty aspect of the agreement in that the terms only apply to the mining sector and 
not to other lands and resource uses. However, there are some positive approaches to 
ensuring some certainty, even if it is limited to just the project at hand. The 
Stk’emlúpsemc ECDA has a clearly defined Engagement Framework for any 
consultations necessary to the mining project. This explicitly outlines the requirements 
and approaches to consultation which provincial officials or third parties must undertake 
prior to any proposed activity relating to the mine. As with other engagement 
frameworks, this provides a solid grounding in approaching a mutually agreed upon 
consultation framework that satisfies both the First Nations desire to be involved in 
decision-making and satisfies the province’s legal obligations to consult. This 
predictability is important, but its limitation to one specific resource in one specific project 
is limiting in terms of ensuring good consultation and accommodation across entire 
traditional territories. 
The Stk’emlúpsemc ECDA scores a medium rating in economic provisions for 
consultation and accommodation. One way it ensures proper economic accommodation 
is in the form of resource revenue sharing payments. It includes financial payments and 
explicitly states how the provincial government will formulate and assess the relevant 
amounts. This agreement even goes so far as to outline the banking procedures for the 
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financial transfers. It lacks, however, implementation funding for the SSN to participate in 
the joint-management body, which limits the economic measures in this agreement and 
allows it a medium score. 
The SSN ECDA moderately encourages good consultation and accommodation 
between the Crown and the two First Nations. It has good relationship building 
mechanisms to help the parties work together to manage the mine, problems that may 
arise with it, and socio-economic issues. It has low certainty provisions in the long-term, 
but does offer predictability for the lifetime of the project through a clearly outlined 
Engagement Framework. It lacks long-term commitments and wide ranging scope that 
do not guarantee economic certainty for other stakeholders in BC. The resource revenue 
sharing is very important and is a good example of strong consultation and 
accommodation measures.  
5.5. Ktunaxa Nation Forest Revenue Sharing Agreement 
The Ktunaxa Nation Forest Revenue Sharing Agreement (FRSA) was signed in 
2011 between the BC government and the four Indian bands that make up the Ktunaxa 
Nation: St. Mary’s, Tobacco Plains, Lower Kootenay and ?Akisq’nuk. The agreement 
provides for consultation and accommodation measures in relation to forestry activities 
within the Ktunaxa traditional territories by offering both a cash and timber component to 
the aboriginal communities.The Ktunaxa FRSA comes from a template used for all forest 
revenue sharing agreements in the province. This program has evolved from older 
Forest and Range Opportunity Agreements. This newer initiative improves upon 
previous problems of population based funding formulas.93  
The Ktunaxa Nation has signed other non-treaty agreements with the province 
that help to improve the consultation and accommodation measures within their 
 
93 See Literature Review Section 3.3 for a detailed analysis of the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternative’s critique of the previous generation of forest and range agreements. 
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particular FRSA. Because of this deviation from the standard FRSA template, the 
Ktunaxa FRSA has high scores in the relationship-building category, low certainty and 
medium economic content scores. 
In terms of relationship building, the Ktunaxa FRSA has highly ranked content 
measures, but most of this is because of the reliance on a separate Strategic 
Engagement Agreement (SEA) for consultation and accommodation measures. Ktunaxa 
Nation Council entered into a comprehensive SEA with the British Columbia 
Government that concerns high-level land and resource management and planning. This 
SEA creates a joint-management body for lands and resources that meets regularly to 
discuss issues. The FRSA refers to this throughout the agreement, but does not build 
upon or expand the existing relationship-building strategies between the two parties. The 
FRSA lacks the detailed Engagement Model that many other agreements have and it 
limits First Nation input in the consultation process to operational and administrative 
matters. This restricts the potential for relationship building of the forest and range 
agreements by creating a mostly paper-based correspondence relationship. 
The Ktuaxa agreement, again relying on referral to its SEA, includes a well-
developed, clearly outlined dispute resolution process. If any of the parties have issue 
with the FRSA, the issue gets referred to a Senior Forum. This jointly developed body is 
a co-management forum that seeks resolution through consensus. It is an established 
process that meets regularly. Clear dispute resolution guidelines help to keep relations 
between the two parties respectful and productive. 
Importantly in terms of relationship building, the Ktunaxa FRSA has an expanded 
description of the socio-economic objectives that both parties intend to pursue. The 
Ktunaxa agreement lists intended outcomes as an improved government-to-government 
relationship, closing aboriginal and non-aboriginal socio-economic gaps, and supporting 
capacity for Ktunaxa self-governance. The agreement then lists Ktunaxa community 
priorities that the funds from the agreement will support. These include education, 
cultural revitalization, housing, infrastructure, health, economic development, land 
stewardship, and governance capacity. All of this content combines to give the Ktunaxa 
FRSA a high score in the relationship-building category. 
 54 
In terms of economic certainty and the predictability and clarity this entails, the 
Ktunaxa FRSA receives a low score. The Ktunaxa FRSA is classified as interim and 
lasts between 3-5 years. This does not ensure long-term future certainty for the 
province, private industry and developers or the First Nations whose traditional territory 
the agreement concerns. Additionally, it has a very limited scope in terms of content and 
refers solely to forestry. Without acknowledging other resources and with such a limited 
lifespan, it lacks both scope and predictability. 
The Ktunaxa FRSA includes some economic aspects of consultation and 
accommodation. The Ktunaxa agreement has a very specific formulation for resource 
revenues. It states that 4% of all forestry resource revenues obtained by the province 
within Ktunaxa traditional territory will go to the Ktunaxa communities through the 
Ktunaxa Nation Council Society. This is because the FRSA program intended to fix the 
template, population-based formula of the previous FRO agreements and directly tie 
compensation to the amount of forestry activity. However, there is no funding for 
Ktunaxa member involvement in consultation and accommodation, nor any 
implementation funding. This results in a medium score for economic accommodation 
content. 
The Ktunaxa FRSA is a unique situation arising from the template approach for 
this type of sector specific agreement. Because the Ktunaxa have a Strategic 
Engagement Agreement with the province that provides highly-rated consultation and 
accommodation measures in the relationship-building categories, such as joint decision-
making forums and dispute resolution processes, their FRSA enjoys these strong 
measures. When it comes to certainty, however, the Ktunaxa FRSA is not a predictable, 
wide-scoping agreement. In terms of economic consultation and accommodation, it 
provides  true resource revenue sharing as a percentage of provincial profits will be paid 
to the Ktunaxa. But lacking implementation or involvement funding, the Ktunaxa FRSA 
does not fully satisfy good consultation and accommodation measures. 
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5.6. Penticton Indian Band of the Okanagan Nation 
Interim Agreement on Forest and Range 
Opportunities 
The Penticton Indian Band (PIB) signed the Forest and Range Opportunity 
(FRO) agreement in March 2009. The FRO originates from a cookie-cutter template that 
duplicates agreements signed by other First Nations across the province. In exchange 
for financial payments and timber allocations, the PIB agree not to challenge the 
province’s forestry activities within their traditional territory. There are some consultation 
and accommodation measures addressed. This format has been replaced by the Forest 
Revenue Sharing Agreement (as examined in the previous case study). The PIB are still 
restricted to the agreement they signed in 2009 under the old format. Here. the 
relationship-building aspects of consultation and accommodation score as medium, they 
provide low measures of certainty and they offer low economic accommodation.  
The Penticton FRO has some relationship-building measures. However, the 
standardized template approach employed by FRO does not give rise to a full and 
complete consultation and accommodation relationship-building measures. It lacks the 
detailed Engagement Model that are contained in many other non-treaty agreements. 
This restricts the potential for relationship building between the provincial government 
and the PIB by creating a mostly paper-based correspondence relationship. 
The consultation process in the Penticton FRO is specifically outlined and refers 
to any administrative or operational decisions made by the Ministry of Forests, or its 
licensees, that may potentially affect Penticton Indian Band’s aboriginal rights and title. It 
has a clearly outlined framework for how ministry officials should approach consulting 
with PIB in regards to these forestry decisions. This limits provincial consultation only to 
operational and administrative areas of forestry, and does not provide for PIB input on 
strategic or high-level planning decisions, limiting the strength of consultation measures. 
Additionally, the Penticton FRO does not guarantee certainty in an effective way. 
Their legal status is currently under debate, after the 2005 BC Supreme Court Huu-ay-
aht decision. Here, the Court ruled against the standardized template of FROs because 
they do not adequately take into account the unique variability of different First Nations 
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in BC. Additionally, the PIB FRO is classified as interim and only lasts for up to five 
years. This does not ensure long-term future certainty for the province, private industry, 
developers or the First Nations whose traditional territory the agreement covers. 
They have some economic provisions in a form of resource revenue sharing, but 
the original population-based formula deviates from true resource revenue sharing. The 
Penticton FRO is much more vague and states that the economic benefits in the 
agreement are not to be considered a share of resource revenues. Instead, they are an 
economic accommodation, the value of which was calculated by the BC government and 
accepted by the Penticton Indian Band. This is based on per population formula and is 
non-negotiable for any First Nation entering into these agreements. The provincial 
government addressed these problems in the newer generation FRSAs. 
The Penticton FRO, like all other FROs originating from the same template, lacks 
consultation and accommodation measures that provide for meaningful and valuable 
input from the PIB. The agreements greatest strengths lie in its relationship building 
measures, but those are limited to the narrow scope of operational and administrative 
decision-making. Additionally, its limited timeframe does not ensure predictability and its 
focus solely on forestry does not provide a consistent consultation and accommodation 
framework for the PIB’s traditional territories. This results in low economic certainty. The 
reliance upon a population-based formula for financially accommodating the First 
Nations in FROs does not signal strong economic accommodation measures, and has 
since been replaced. 
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5.7. Research Findings: Conclusion 
Table 1: Rating Consultation and Accommodation Content in Non-Treaty 
Agreements 
 Relationship-
Building 
Certainty Economic 
Provisions 
Haida Nation High High High 
Taku River Tlingit High High High 
Tahltan Nation High Medium Low 
Stk’emlúpsemc High  Medium Medium 
Ktunanxa Nation High Low Medium 
Penticton Indian Band Medium Low Low 
 
This research shows that there is a vast discrepancy in  consultation and 
accommodation measures included in BC’s consultation and accommodation 
agreements with aboriginal communities. The differences extend to agreements of the 
same kind, such as the differences seen between the Haida Reconciliation Protocol and 
the Taku River Tlingit agreement, both of which are comprehensive land use 
agreements. The agreements differ in their topic areas with the Haida agreement 
focusing more on forestry while the TRT agreement centres more on commercial 
recreation and mining potential; each acknowledges the economic realities presented by 
their geographic location. Yet these differences do not effect the value rankings of the 
consultation and accommodation content. This highlights how variety in non-treaty 
agreements is a valuable asset. Flexibility to orient agreements to the particular 
geographic, social, economic, cultural and historical particularities of First Nations is very 
important in crafting a good consultation and accommodation agreement.  
The matrix above also illustrates that variety is not necessarily a good thing. 
From the Haida agreement through to the Penticton FRO, there is a large discrepancy in 
rankings of consultation and accommodation measures. Part of this discrepancy 
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between agreements is due to the patchwork approach of accommodation agreements 
employed by the provincial government and First Nations. That is, most of the 
participating First Nations in these case studies do not have just one agreement 
regarding accommodation with the senior levels of government. In fact, the Haida Nation 
has signed roughly fourteen agreements with local, regional, provincial and federal 
governments encompassing everything from sports fisheries, to land use planning to 
marine park protection, since 1992. It is no coincidence that this experience in 
negotiating agreements and working with different levels of government assisted the 
Haida in negotiating a Reconciliation Agreement with some of the strongest measures of 
consultation and accommodation, including something very close to complete co-
jurisdiction over Haida Gwaii.  
Charles Porter, Assistant Deputy Minister of Negotiations and Regional 
Operations for MARR acknowledges that the Haida Reconciliation Protocol was borne 
out of a unique set of circumstances. A long relationship with the provincial government 
preceded the Haida’s negotiation of the Reconciliation Protocol. This included extreme 
conflict, in the form of blockades and court challenges, but also included collaborative 
efforts in the form of land use planning agreements and protected areas designation. 
The agreement, he admits, sets a poor precedent for the rest of First Nations in BC, who 
seek to achieve the same statutory decision-making powers. Thus, although I have 
included it in my set of case studies, provincial representatives maintain that comparing 
this agreement with others is not applicable.  
In contrast with the Haida Nation’s long list of agreements and complex and 
valuable economic measures is the Penticton Indian Band’s agreement on Forest and 
Range Opportunities. Standing virtually alone as their only interaction with the provincial 
government, and with no other non-treaty agreements to refer to, this agreement 
signifies the lowest grade of consultation and accommodation. The consultation required 
by the province is limited to operational and administrative decisions that will be sent via 
notifications to the PIB. There is no government-to-government or shared decision-
making forum to give voice to PIB concerns and the dispute resolution process is very 
limited compared with other agreements. These two examples show the marked 
disparity among BC’s accommodation agreements and the issues of inequality that this 
situation creates. 
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This variety in strength of consultation and accommodation agreements indicates 
a lack of consistency in the province’s approach to negotiating, developing, 
implementing and sustaining these agreements. Across different agreements and within 
the same types of agreements, different First Nations are achieving different levels of 
consultation and accommodation in these agreements. 
The provincial government’s hodgepodge approach to negotiating is exemplified 
here. Yes, going into each non-treaty negotiating system is unique, but without a clear 
picture of expectations or standards on either side of the table, the result is an unequal 
distribution of consultation and accommodation measures. Non-treaty agreements are 
beneficial because of their flexibility, but this variety and inequity displayed above is 
unacceptable for both its lack of predictable economic certainty for the province and its 
unequal distribution of benefits to BC’s First Nations. 
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6. Analysis  
Content, or substance, of consultation and accommodation is widely varied. As 
evidenced by the research throughout this report, these non-treaty agreements have 
little standardization across themselves. Although flexibility and variation is a good thing 
in terms of First Nations in BC – as evidenced by the strong support of this in the 
interview data – the lack of minimum inclusions has the potential to create vast 
inequalities amongst BC’s First Nations.  
The research shows that variety in non-treaty agreements is both a blessing and 
a curse. Too much variability leads to uncertainty and inequalities while not enough 
flexibility leads to rigid cookie-cutter, template approaches that do not adequately 
acknowledge the vast differences amongst BC’s First Nations. This variety slows down 
negotiations of these agreements because neither side has a solid starting place. Variety 
in non-treaty agreements also heightens the risk of encouraging litigation because it 
treats different First Nations differently, favouring the nations with more concentrated 
resources in their territories. Any policy changes to provincial non-treaty negotiations 
must walk a fine line between an unpredictable lack of standards and being overly 
prescriptive and too rigid. 
In order to rectify the problems here, the provincial government should adopt a 
set of minimum standards to include in consultation and accommodation agreements. 
These inclusions would help to standardize negotiations and bring equality to the 
process. Provincial staff, particularly negotiators, First Nations, the public and private 
industry will all benefit from the clarity and predictability afforded by a minimum 
framework.  
The development of a minimum class of content for future non-treaty agreements 
will not only simplify the process, bringing some predictability to a very unclear, 
haphazardly approached situation, it will also ensure that First Nations in BC are treated 
equitably at the negotiating table. Equal treatment means that every First Nation will 
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receive minimum considerations in the above areas. There will be less of a reliance on 
experienced negotiating, financial and human resources capacity to secure good 
consultation and accommodation measures from the provincial government. 
It is important to note that the implementation of minimum standards is not a 
move towards formula-based approaches or cookie-cutter agreements. Ensuring 
minimum content inclusions allows for the variability of First Nations’ situations in BC 
while also permitting aboriginal communities in BC to have equitable footing in entering 
into these negotiations with the province. Minimums provide a baseline that negotiators 
can build and expand upon. As no two First Nations are the same, no two agreements 
will be alike. However, with the implementation of standardized minimums, no First 
Nations will be left out and the province will not be at a risk for litigation challenges to 
their current consultation and accommodation agreement policies.  
A baseline framework of good consultation and accommodation measures will 
not affect the important variability and flexibility of these policy tools. All of the options 
are flexible, can change over time and can adapt to different political, geographical and 
economic situations in British Columbia. This allows the minimum standards approach to 
fall in line with recent court decisions such as Wil’litswx v. BC (2008) and Huu-Ay-Aht 
First Nation et al. v. The Minister of Forests et al. (2005) that demand the province 
acknowledge the unique characteristics of First Nations in designing consultation and 
accommodation measures. 
For these reasons, the policy analysis in this report is broken into two different 
sections. First of all, I determine which content options should form a set of minimums. I 
evaluate the options upon a set of criteria and pick the highest scoring options to create 
a ‘basket’ of relevant, important base inclusions for non-treaty agreements. In the next 
section, I look at four different options for implementing these minimum standards. 
These implementation strategies are again evaluated against a set of criteria that takes 
into account provincial objectives, First Nations equity and the BC public’s priorities.  
 62 
6.1. Minimum Content Determination 
6.1.1. Options and Measurement Criteria 
In order to prepare a definitive list of content that every accommodation 
agreement should include, I have used all the research above – literature reviews, case 
studies and key informant interviews – to compile a list of potential inclusions. These 
vary from the common to the rarities. I then use the same research methods to compile 
a list of criteria to evaluate these content options against. The criteria take the form of a 
set of questions, all of which can be answered with a yes or a no. The wording is such 
that a yes answer is a positive and means that the option has positive values to the non-
treaty agreements. An answer of no, or an ‘x’, indicates that the option lacks those 
positive qualities. Next I use this analysis to recommend a set of baseline minimum 
standards that BC should implement in moving forward with their accommodation 
agreements. 
The list of potential options that could be included in non-treaty agreements are 
as follows. For explanatory definitions of each of the terms, refer to Appendix A. 
• Engagement Framework 
• Self-Government Recognition 
• Employment and Education 
• Business Participation 
• Environmental Management 
• Government-to-Government Forum 
• Monitoring and Evaluation of the Agreement 
• Implementation Funding 
• Resource Revenue Sharing 
• Co-Management Bodies 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Economic Accommodation 
• Carbon Offset Programs 
• Land Use Plans 
• Socio-Economic Objectives 
• Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
The list of determining criteria and an explanatory question follows below. Certain 
important criteria, although relevant to this analysis, were omitted. Relationship-building 
and long-term reconciliation, while crucial to the effectiveness of these agreements, 
would be achieved by all of the above options. And, as it is not relevant to include criteria 
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which does not discriminate amongst the options, I have excluded those criteria from the 
discussion. 
Certainty: Does this option provide for economic certainty over land rights and provide 
for some measures of predictability? 
Legal: Will this option help the Crown satisfy their legal duty to consult? 
Cost: Will the provincial government be able to execute this option without a significant 
contribution of new, incremental financial outputs? This is defined as over $100,000 per 
year. 
Reconciliation: Does this option work towards providing long-term reconciliation between 
assertions of Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal title in BC? 
Efficiency: Will this option allow for the business practices of BC to continue in an 
effective and efficient manner?  
Implementation: Will this option be easy for regional provincial staff to implement? Will 
they be able to begin this new program without the need for a vastly different 
administrative system and program directives? 
Capacity: Will First Nations be able to develop and implement this option without the 
need for increased financial and human resources capacity? 
Socio-Economics: Will this option help to close the socio-economic gaps between 
Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal communities in BC? 
Flexibility: Does this option have the ability to be altered over time for changing 
circumstances? 
Geographic Realities: Will this option be able to be pursued by all First Nations in BC, 
regardless of their geographic realities and the availability of resources in their 
territories?  
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6.1.2. Analysis of Content Options 
Using a ‘check’ and ‘ex’ matrix, I have evaluated the options as follows.  
Table 2: Check/Ex Evaluation of Possible Content Measures 
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Engagement 
Framework 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
Self-Government 
Recognition 
✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Employment and 
Education 
✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Business 
Participation 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Environmental 
Management 
✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Government to 
Government 
Forum 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Implementation 
Funding 
✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Resource Revenue 
Sharing 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Co-Management 
Bodies 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Dispute 
Resolution 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Economic 
Accommodation 
✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Carbon Offsets ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Land Use Plans ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Socio Economic 
Objectives 
✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Free Prior and 
Informed Consent 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
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When assessing these options, I chose a minimum score of 7/10 to move 
forward to become a must-have content piece in a consultation and accommodation 
agreement. With this scoring framework in mind, the following content basket that will 
best satisfy provincial objectives while also ensuring First Nations equality are as 
follows: 
• Resource Revenue Sharing 
• Economic Accommodation 
• Implementation Funding 
• Engagement Framework 
• Business Participation 
• Government to Government Forum 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Land Use Plans 
• Socio-Economic Objectives 
The province should implement minimum standards for each of these options for 
any accommodation agreements moving forward. In the economic categories, resource 
revenue sharing, economic accommodation and implementation funding all satisfy 
enough criteria to make it into the recommended basket. These are very important in 
order to overcome First Nations’ lack of financial resources and capacity. As well, 
adequate funding mechanisms are necessary to ensure that First Nations will be able to 
participate in the agreement and live up to its terms. These content inclusions will cost 
the province a sizeable amount, but they are crucial to the validity and longevity of non-
treaty agreements. Resource revenue sharing and economic accommodation are 
dependent on geographical resource distribution realities, so these may have to be 
entered into the minimums as “where possible” or “according to resource realities” 
clauses. 
Engagement Frameworks, G2G Forums and dispute resolution are three more 
essential parts of a consultation and accommodation agreement. These promote viable 
working relationships between both sides and allow for a spirit of trust and respect 
between the province and First Nations. These may cause some challenges for 
provincial staff at the operational and implementation level. Also, these require adequate 
First Nations capacity to work effectively. Despite these drawbacks, they offer many 
positives for good consultation and accommodation measures that involve the First 
Nations in territorial decision-making.  
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Encouraging business participation of First Nations through joint ventures, equity 
stakes and contracting opportunities rates highly. Although the province cannot 
specifically attend to this, it can work with the private sector and resource developers to 
build funding and services for these programs. A commitment to tripartite action plans 
should be acknowledged in non-treaty agreements. 
The development of land use plans that are endorsed by the particular 
community is also very important to any accommodation agreement concerning lands 
and resources. This allows for clarity amongst all concerned parties and provides a 
vehicle for government and First Nation representatives to work together to reach a 
common understanding. Likewise, the statement of socio-economic objectives in non-
treaty agreements also rates very highly. Like land use plans, these relate common 
goals and objectives of aboriginal communities and allow the province and the First 
Nations to collaborate. However, this should be approached with caution. The province 
must not be overly prescriptive with outlining and shaping the First Nations’ socio-
economic objectives. Don Bain, of the UBCIC, stated that this behaviour by provincial 
representatives runs the risk of being paternalistic and offensive to First Nations, who 
should be given the right to decide for themselves how money is used. 
6.2. Implementation Determination 
 With the basket of content option standards above, I now to turn to the 
implementation issue of such minimum standards in non-treaty agreements. There are 
four options for how to implement this basket of baseline standards. The first option is 
the status quo, meaning no implementation mechanisms. Issuing a new policy statement 
for the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation (MARR) is the second option 
for implementing a base standard of minimums. This would be a government policy for 
MARR negotiating staff to work with when approaching non-treaty agreements. The third 
option for the province is to enact specific legislation regarding consultation and 
accommodation agreements. The last policy option is to implement broad based 
recognition legislation across that includes minimum standards for consultation and 
accommodation agreements. Much like the failed attempt of Gordon Campbell’s 
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Recognition and Reconciliation Act 2009, this would acknowledge aboriginal title claims 
as valid across British Columbia. 
6.2.1. Implementation Criteria  
I will assess each of the four options against a set of criteria. Relevant criteria to 
include are political feasibility, legal feasibility (the freedom from risk of litigation), cost to 
the provincial government, negotiating timeline, assurance of economic certainty, 
stakeholder acceptance, public acceptance, First Nations acceptance, and equity across 
BC First Nations. I have not included cost in the analysis because no one option would 
cost the provincial government significantly more. All options, excluding the status quo, 
require staff resources having to develop and draft the options, but do not require 
significant revenue expenditures.  
I also omitted First Nations acceptance from the list of criteria because I was 
unfortunately not able to secure many First Nation personnel interviews during my 
research. Without definitive opinions, I do not believe generalizing or hypothesizing on 
their views about implementation is  the fair or correct thing to do. Instead, I have 
decided to measure the options against level of involvement from First Nations required. 
This will measure the level of consultation required by each option in order to design and 
implement it. Since political feasibility will be captured by stakeholder acceptance and 
public acceptance, I omitted it as well. All of the descriptions of the criteria and their 
measurements scales can be found in Appendix B.  
6.2.2. Analysis of Implementation Options 
With the above criteria and measures I have evaluated the four options with the 
following scores. 
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Table 3: Multi-Criteria Evaluation of Implementation Options 
  Status Quo 
Policy 
Statement 
Specific 
Legislation 
Recognition 
Legislation 
Certainty Low Low High High 
Legal 
Feasibility 
Low Low High Medium 
Public 
Acceptance 
High High Medium Low 
Stakeholder 
Acceptance 
Low Medium High Medium 
First Nation 
Involvement 
Low Medium Medium High 
Equity Low Medium High High 
The status quo scored very low in most categories. It scored high in public 
acceptance because the public is relatively unaware of the current approach and it is not 
a pertinent, public issue in British Columbia today. Staying with the status quo will not 
draw significant media attention and thus will minimize high profile political conflict 
making it a politically acceptable option. The status quo would be the easiest and least 
costly option, as well, with the province just maintaining their current haphazard, piece-
meal system of one-off accommodation agreements.  Unfortunately, it does leave the 
problem at a significant risk for litigation. It also treats the First Nations in BC unequally. 
This approach is not currently acceptable because of its uncertainty, unpredictability, 
unequal treatment of BC First Nations and the resulting risks of litigation. Based on the 
analysis, I do not recommend this option. 
A non-binding policy statement scored in the medium range. Like the status quo, 
it would have high public acceptance due to the fact that there would be no opposition 
garnered by a policy direction like this. Certainty and legal feasibility would be low, 
because it would not ensure long-term predictability for the province and this could lead 
to legal challenges and litigation. Any new policy statement regarding consultation and 
accommodation would require some consultation with First Nations. This would most 
likely involve a large representative bodies like the First Nations Leadership Council so it 
scored a medium in First Nations Involvement. It would help to equalize the bargaining 
position of First Nations in BC, but would lack statutory regulations to dissuade MARR 
from only engaging the resource-rich First Nations. Thus, it scored a medium on the 
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equity criteria. A policy statement would be more flexible than other legislated options 
but its variability may result in the same issues we see today. Based on the analysis, I 
do not recommend this option. 
Broad based legislation creates a framework for moving forward with the 
acknowledgement of aboriginal title without strength of claim assessments.94 The 2009 
attempt did not make it past the dialogue phase, as First Nations organizations in BC did 
not entirely support it. Termed as a ‘game-changer’ it would be a significant step and 
would become very politically charged. Stakeholders, such as business and industry 
organizations would want input on the legislation, and the public would want a significant 
amount of information beyond just a discussion paper. However, despite this extensive 
work in the drafting phase, it would provide long-term stability and assurance to the 
aboriginal rights and title issues in BC.  
Broad-based recognition legislating recognizing aboriginal title across BC 
achieves high ratings for certainty and equity. It would require extensive First Nations 
collaboration at all levels of governance. This option would require significant public 
consultation mechanisms as well, as in the 2009 proposal, when six public forums were 
held across the province. Public acceptance would be low. This is a comparison 
measurement, when compared to the other options. If the 2009 attempt was any 
example, there will be a great deal of opposition for all kinds of public individuals and 
organizations. Stakeholder acceptance would be medium, with some industry 
organizations applauding the move towards finalized certainty and predictability and 
others against the acknowledgement of title. Finally, legal feasibility scores a medium. 
Charles Porter, Assistant Deputy Minister of MARR argues that there remains the 
question of whether British Columbia can, according to the constitutional division of 
powers, acknowledge aboriginal title in the province without the involvement of the 
 
94 A strength of claim assessment uses biological, geographic, historical, archaeological, and 
ethnographic data, along with oral histories and mapping techniques to determine the 
strength of aboriginal rights and title claims in a First Nation’s claimed traditional territory. See 
Section 5.1.4 for a discussion on why these can be challenging for First Nations. 
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federal government. These questions may lead to lengthy litigation. Based on the 
analysis, I do not recommend this option. 
Specific legislation enacted by the provincial government regarding non-treaty 
agreement scores the most favourably out of all the options. It would provide high levels 
of certainty for the province and would be feasible for the legislature to effect. Public 
acceptance would be medium, since there may be some media attention to the 
implementation of minimums in these agreements, and this may cause some dissent 
amongst the public. Stakeholder acceptance would be high because business and 
resource developers would benefit from the standardization and predictability of such 
reliable legislation. The province would require input from First Nations leadership 
organizations, such as the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, BC Assembly of First Nations, the 
First Nations Summit and the First Nations Leadership Council. But, they would not need 
to extend the process to individual communities, due to the legislation’s more specific 
nature. It would legislate equal treatment of First Nations at the negotiating process, thus 
earning a high score of equity.  
By legislating a statutory minimum for non-treaty agreements, the standards 
would be well-enforced and well-publicized. The public, government employees, First 
Nations and industry officials would all be well aware of the minimum standards in 
consultation and accommodation agreements. Limited to minimum standards, there 
would still be variability and flexibility allowed for in negotiations. Crafting this legislation 
would take a significant amount of time before it could be implemented. However, as this 
legislation is specific to the non-treaty agreements, and not broadly applicable to other 
areas of First Nations rights and title claims, it would not ignite significant political or 
media attention and public opinions. Based on the analysis, I recommend this option. 
6.3. Challenges in Implementing Minimum Standards 
Three distinct challenges will arise in implementing a minimum basket of 
standards. First of all, there is the challenge of garnering First Nations support for the 
policies. In BC, there are 203 First Nations, numerous national governments, tribal 
councils and leadership organizations. Expecting 100% approval from all of these 
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representative groups is unrealistic. No one policy will satisfy each of these groups 
equally. By bringing Aboriginal leadership figures into the discussion and drafting of 
these minimum standards though, and extending the consultation process, the province 
will be better positioned to make these policy changes with some level of First Nations 
support.  
Second of all, the windfall concept is an inescapable reality that will play a large 
role in determining relationships between the province and First Nations in BC. The 
geographic realities of resource distribution cannot be changed or altered through policy 
work; an economy cannot be built out of nothing. So although these minimum standards 
aim to level the playing field and bring some equality to First Nations across BC, in 
today’s economy, the First Nations with substantial natural resources in their traditional 
territories will benefit more from consultation and accommodation agreements.  
Lastly, any aboriginal policy measure in BC will be challenged by the absence of 
public acceptance. There exists a fundamental lack of public knowledge surrounding 
aboriginal matters, including history, culture and legal status, in our province. This goes 
far beyond this specific policy surrounding non-treaty agreements. In order to advance 
the reconciliation process, whether through treaties, non-treaty agreements or any other 
kinds of policies, the province needs to find a way to inform the public on the nature of 
aboriginal rights and title, the importance of the historical situation and the need for 
progressive, inclusive policy strategies. Until the general public understands the 
situation, it remains difficult to advance the necessary policies to bring about 
reconciliation. 
Although significant challenges exist, that is no reason for the province to shy 
away from implementing the recommended policies. Many of these problems will 
continue to exist far into the future, but by taking informed steps in a positive direction, 
the province can pragmatically begin to address reconciliation through fair, equal and 
economically certain non-treaty agreements.. 
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7. Concluding Recommendations 
The problems associated with the BC government’s approach to non-treaty 
agreements stem for an unpredictable variety that does not ensure certainty for 
investors, nor equity for First Nations. The province is taking positive steps, through the 
New Relationship, to find ways of reconciling assertions of Crown sovereignty and 
Aboriginal title in BC. In order to address these specific problems, there needs to be a 
standardized, base-level content minimum for consultation and accommodation 
agreements. This will not become a cookie-cutter approach with template agreements, 
but rather a minimum approach to negotiate around, that provides certainty, clarity and 
equality. The minimums that emerged from the criteria analysis are as follows:  
• Resource Revenue Sharing 
• Economic Accommodation 
• Implementation Funding 
• Engagement Framework 
• Business Participation 
• Government to Government Forum 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Land Use Plans 
• Socio-Economic Objectives 
In the face of many different policy tools that the government has at its disposal 
to implement these options, the multi-criteria analysis tool provided me the best, 
although an admittedly subjective, assessment of the options. According to the second 
criteria measurement exercise, I recommend that the province opt for specific legislation 
regarding consultation and accommodation agreements in order to implement the 
preceding list of minimum standards. Specific legislation emerged as the paramount 
option when assessed against the multiple criteria in the previous section. Although this 
will too have its challenges, the benefits of clarity, certainty, stakeholder acceptance and 
First Nations input into the process are extremely valuable.  
A minimum basket of content measures defined within a statutory, legislated 
framework in British Columbia is the best policy option moving forward. Not all First 
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Nations will be engaged in this process, due to their own choosing or perhaps due to 
their practical realities. But, if they so choose too, they can be assured that they will be 
treated the same, regardless of negotiating, financial or human resource capacities. The 
provincial government will benefit from this by having a clear and definitive statutory-
based framework within which to operate. Also, by working towards equal treatment, that 
is not based on per population, cookie-cutter formulas but on a basic set of minimum 
standards with which to work into negotiations, the province will reduce risks of costly, 
lengthy legal challenges. The business community, including resource developers and 
investors, will benefit from this legislation by having a clear and certain direction and 
improved certainty over lands and resources in the province, helping to clear up some of 
the confusions. 
This will be a positive step in the right direction. None of these implementation 
options are perfect and none will ultimately bring a definitive end to all the aboriginal 
rights and title issues in British Columbia. Chief Kim Baird of the Tswassen First Nation, 
speaking to a class of SFU students about her experience in the treaty process, “you 
cannot let the perfect deal get in the way of a good deal.” It is with this pragmatic 
approach to taking incremental steps in the right direction that the province should 
approach a set of minimum standards for consultation and accommodation agreements. 
There will never be a perfect approach, but with the right values in mind, we can all 
move forward together down the right path.  
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Appendix A – Content Definitions 
 
 
Content Option 
 
Definition 
 
Engagement 
Framework 
 
Clearly outlined set of processes and procedures relating 
to consultation. This includes a matrix that determines 
the level of consultation in relation to the area and level 
of potential disturbance. 
 
 
Self-Government 
Recognition 
 
The provincial government agrees to acknowledge the 
First Nations right to be a self-governing First Nation in 
the preamble of the document and the decision-making 
power this entails. 
 
 
Employment and 
Education 
 
This can include job quotas for First Nations, job training, 
employment opportunities and educational strategies 
such as scholarships and courses offered. 
 
 
Business 
Participation 
 
This can range from equity stakes, to joint ventures, to 
employment contracts offered to First Nations, either by a 
third party or facilitated by the province. 
 
 
Environmental 
Management 
 
This includes a legitimate voice in the ongoing 
management of the environment, from ensuring 
standards to enforcing provincial regulations. 
 
 
Government-to-
Government Forum 
 
This is a body that comprises of equal numbers of First 
Nations and provincial representatives that meets 
regularly to discuss issues related to the agreement. It is 
based on consensus decision-making and relationship 
building. 
 
 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the 
Agreement 
 
 
This means that the agreement includes clauses that 
allow for the agreement to have program evaluation in 
place, with set dates for progress reports.  
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Implementation 
Funding 
 
 
This includes any financial resources guaranteed in the 
agreement to go to the First Nations in order for them to 
carry out the terms of the agreement. 
 
 
Resource Revenue 
Sharing 
 
 
This is the provincial granting of resource revenues or 
rents earned from private resource developers.  
 
Co-Management 
Bodies 
 
Co-management bodies are comprised of equal numbers 
of provincial and First Nations representatives and are 
responsible for the statutory decision-making over lands 
and resources. 
 
 
Dispute Resolution 
 
This includes any significant framework that allows for 
decision-making to be explicitly detailed in the 
agreement. 
 
 
Economic 
Accommodation 
 
This is financial compensation to the First Nations in 
order to accommodate any infringements on their 
claimed rights and title. 
 
 
Carbon Offset 
Programs 
 
This allows the province to purchase carbon credits 
created when a First Nation protects a large area of 
forests. 
 
 
Land Use Plans 
 
These are comprehensive plans that cover a wide area 
that First Nations and the province agree upon. They 
detail which areas are available for what kinds of 
resource development and which areas are to be 
protected. 
 
 
Socio-Economic 
Objectives 
 
These can include any number of priorities that a First 
Nation identifies in order to improve their communities. A 
list of objectives can guide the use of funding in the 
agreements. 
 
 
Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent 
 
This is the basis of the UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. It maintains that any resource 
development on traditional territories must be done with 
this from the First Nations. Including this clause in an 
agreement would help give rise to the UN DRIP in BC. 
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Appendix B – Implementation Criteria 
 
 
Criteria Description Measurement 
Certainty Will this provide long-term predictability for 
the province? Will this be able to stand up 
over time? Will this be permanent and not 
dependent on the political will of the 
majority party? 
High, Medium, Low 
Legal Feasibility Will this stand up to legal court 
challenges? Will this have grounding in 
constitutional law? Will this legally uphold 
the honour of the Crown? 
High, Medium, Low 
Public Acceptance Will the BC public be in favor of this? Will 
this cause a major backlash against the 
province? 
High, Medium, Low 
Stakeholder 
Acceptance 
Will interest groups like business, private 
industry and investors approve of this? 
Will they support the province and 
continue working here? 
High, Medium, Low 
Level of Involvement 
Of First Nations 
Needed 
Will the province need to extensively 
consult with First Nations before 
implementing this option? Will the province 
have to go beyond the First Nations 
Leadership councils and organizations and 
into community consultations? 
High, Medium, Low 
